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Historians widely acknowledge that the Second World War witnessed a 
substantial degree of ideology in the conflict itself. This paper will establish the 
degree to which the ideology of National Socialism shaped the Wehrmacht’s 
decision-making process prior to and during their occupation of the Soviet Union, 
as well as the outcomes of those decisions. To this end, those in positions of 
authority in the military – including Hitler himself, the OKW, the OKH and 
various subordinate commanders – will be examined to determine how National 
Socialist tenets shaped their plans and efforts to quell and exploit the occupied 
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HSSPF – Hoher SS- und Polizei Führer (Higher SS and Police Leader) – SS commanders 
designated to command SS and police forces behind the army groups in the Soviet Union 
NSDAP – Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party) – formal German name of the Nazi party 
NSFO – Nationalsozialistischer Führungsoffiziere (National Socialist Leadership Officers) – 
Wehrmacht Nazi ideological officers established in late 1943 
OKW – Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – Wehrmacht high command 
OKH – Oberkommando des Heeres – Army high command 
OMi – Ostministerium –Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories led by Alfred 
Rosenberg 
RSHA – Reichssicherheitshauptampt (Reich Security Main Office) – headquarter agency for 
Himmler in his dual capacities as head of the SS and chief of German police 
SS – Schutzstaffel – paramilitary arm of the Nazi party, commanded by Heinrich Himmler 
WiStab Ost – Wirtschaftsstab Ost – Economic planning agency for the occupied Soviet Union 






 Few events have done so much to shape the twenty-first century world as the Second 
World War, still relatively recent in the context of historical events. By extension, the conflict 
between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, where much of the fiercest and bloodiest fighting 
of the entire war took place, did much to shape the course of history. It was there, in Eastern 
Europe, that the Wehrmacht – the vast and powerful armed forces of Nazi Germany – was 
broken.  From the protracted siege of Leningrad, to the brutal urban battle in Stalingrad, to 
colossal armoured battles such as took place in Operation “Citadel”, along with hundreds of 
other engagements, three years of sustained combat finally sent the Germans definitely reeling 
back towards their own lands. The defeat of Nazi Germany, however, was paid for with 
incomprehensible amounts of death and destruction. Recent estimates of the death toll on the 
Soviet side – civilian and military – put the total between 25,000,000 and 30,000,000, to say 
nothing of those injured or otherwise affected. In exchange, some 80% of the Wehrmacht’s 
approximately 13,500,000 total casualties were inflicted in the Soviet Union.
1
 Seen from this 
perspective, it becomes apparent that the “Eastern Front” or the “Great Patriotic War”, as it is 
known in the countries of the former Soviet Union, really was the decisive theatre during the 
Second World War. 
 Unfortunately, due perhaps to either postwar politics or a focus on the experiences of 
their respective countries, the other Allied nations, particularly in the West, have largely 
overlooked the impact and importance of what occurred there. Interest in the West regarding the 
Soviet Union’s war against Nazi Germany was for decades predominantly academic in nature, 
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and even then often overshadowed by other events in the Second World War. One fact remains 
true regarding the Second World War, however: there is no shortage of material or topics to 
study. In recent years more accessible content, in both academia and broader culture, has become 
available, and it appears that awareness of the scale and severity of what transpired on the 
Eastern Front is on the rise. This holds true for the focus of this paper: specifically, the war 
behind the German front line. Yet, in spite of growing interest and understanding of the conflict 
as a whole, the war between the German occupation and partisans remains understudied and is 
often mired in misunderstanding and latent politics. In this regard, the chronological proximity of 
the actual events to today adds an additional context for those studying them, of which they must 
be aware. Nevertheless, this aspect of the conflict deserves greater exposure and clarification in 
order to better understand what occurred there. 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the manner in which the Wehrmacht fought on 
the Eastern Front, in particular in the rear areas. In other theatres of the Second World War the 
Wehrmacht fought in a way that hardly differed from that of its opponents, but on the Eastern 
Front German plans, actions and even basic precepts, such as the humane treatment of prisoners, 
were altered. This seems to have primarily been the case as a result of the Weltanschauung 
(worldview) of National Socialism. Although politics and the outlook of the ruling party are not 
always determinative for the attitudes and actions of armed forces, in the case of the Wehrmacht 
and National Socialism, they were. In the case of the relationship between the German people 
and National Socialism, there was real and significant adherence amongst the populace to the 
ideology offered by this political party, including in the armed forces. This included a renewal of 




desired Volksgemeinschaft (“people’s community”).
2
 Forged amidst the economic and political 
uncertainty that dominated the German Weimar Republic during the interwar period, this 
relationship found the two agreeing upon the need to restore Germany as a great power, via the 
revival of militaristic nationalism and the combating of left-wing radicals. With the charismatic 
leader of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), Adolf Hitler, pushing 
rearmament at breakneck pace following his election in 1933, the Wehrmacht quickly became 
further entangled with the darker aspects of National Socialist ideology. This included the 1934 
revision of the oath taken by German soldiers to reflect this new relationship. Rather than 
swearing loyalty to the German nation and its constitution, soldiers instead pledged themselves 
to the person of Adolf Hitler as leader of Germany. This entirely altered the links between the 
leader of Germany and the military. The outcome of this was the abandonment by the  
Wehrmacht of its long-held political neutrality in favour of the Weltanschauungskrieg concept. 
Best described as the belief in a war between worldviews, this concept, in tandem with Hitler’s 
ideology, were applied particularly with regard to the Soviet Union.  
 This existentialist framework, applied to a war long before it had begun or even been 
planned, set the stage for a brutal struggle which was further exacerbated by the desire to secure 
smooth logistics in occupied areas. As old as warfare itself, this concept was defined a month 
prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union as “combat in the front, quiet in the rear.”
3
 The 
definition of what “quiet” meant, however, was open to interpretation. Much has been made of 
the fact that the German Army had a long tradition of harsh reactions to resistance from civilians, 
perceived or real, dating at least from the Franco-Prussian War. The extent to which this tradition 
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informed and shaped the Wehrmacht’s occupation in the Soviet Union is not entirely clear. What 
is apparent is the fact that an existential ruthlessness planned for the front line combat there was 
purposefully extended to the rear. The plans for the conflict with the Soviet Union, specifically 
regarding the policies of occupation and counterinsurgency, were a direct outcome of the 
ideology of National Socialism as formulated by Hitler and accepted by the Wehrmacht. This 
ideology played a key role in encouraging the suppression of all resistance by any means, 
including the most extreme violence, undermining attempts to secure the rear via a more rational 
and balanced approach, the end result being that the Wehrmacht failed to subdue the populace. 
Beliefs, after all, have significance and the ideology of National Socialism must not be taken 
lightly for its role in shaping how the Wehrmacht fought its war in the Soviet Union.
4
 
 While the purpose of this research is to examine the Wehrmacht’s planning for and 
responses to resistance experienced behind the front line, the scope extends beyond that at times. 
This stems primarily from the fact that counterinsurgency, as it is properly understood, also 
encompasses more than merely a military response. As an insurgency is best defined as the 
attempt to undermine political, social and economic governmental control of a given area via an 
organized effort, an effective counterinsurgency policy necessarily seeks to counteract such 
efforts through a broad campaign to maintain control in all areas. The central reason for this 
expansive type of conflict is based on the fact that insurgencies primarily affect the civilian 
population. This general understanding of insurgent-style warfare was also the case with regards 
to the occupation of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. While not effective in the 
sense of achieving victory, the German counterinsurgency there did attempt to utilize methods to 
reduce resistance that went beyond merely brute force. While the emphasis remains on the 
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Wehrmacht’s efforts to counteract the partisans, it is vital to the framework of this study that 
such an examination includes peripheral efforts that had a direct influence on the insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. To that end, this paper will examine the Wehrmacht’s counterinsurgency, and 
how they operated in the framework of the broader occupation policy. Furthermore, it is vital to 
keep in mind when discussing this topic that counterinsurgencies, just like broader wars, are 
often covered in broad strokes, a fact that tends to ignore individual agency. All actors, from 
German soldiers to Soviet partisans and the civilians caught in the middle experienced this 
conflict in a myriad of ways and responded in a correspondingly varied number of ways. It is 
thus best to conclude that these issues are not black and white: instead they are grey at best. 
The literature on Germany’s war with the Soviet Union is growing, as is the 
understanding of the impact of ideology in the context of the Second World War. There is, 
however, little writing on ideology in the occupation. The question that this paper attempts to 
answer is this: to what extent did the ideology of National Socialism, as institutionalized in the 
Wehrmacht in the months leading up to the invasion, shape the Wehrmacht’s interactions with 
the Soviet civilian populace, as well as other occupation authorities? This remains an important 
area of study, particularly in the West, where such research is still lacking. In discussing this 
topic, however, it is vital to remember that establishing uniform culpability or ideological 
adherence for all, or even most soldiers of the Wehrmacht remains a difficult task at best. As 
such, this study investigates institutional policy and practice, rather than debating such general 
issues. The millions of soldiers that served in the Wehrmacht through the Second World War 
experienced the conflict and National Socialism in various ways that do not make for easy or 
reasonable generalizations. Establishing the historiographical and methodological context of this 




Socialism’s Weltanschauung was, and what it meant for a potential conflict with the Soviet 
Union. An examination of the planning phase of the invasion – lasting from mid-1940 to June 
1941 – will follow in Chapter Three. Chapter Four will focus on the first six months of the 
invasion, and discuss both the impact of front line combat in shaping the rear, as well as the early 
occupation efforts of the Wehrmacht. Finally, Chapter Five will outline the occupation and 
counterinsurgency between 1942 and mid-1944 to highlight the growth and continued influence 



















CHAPTER ONE: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
The “Clean” Wehrmacht 
 The conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union represents a gargantuan piece of 
human history and suffering.  The scale, severity and sheer struggle for survival on the Eastern 
Front continues to fascinate both historians and the broader public. This interest is in part fuelled 
by the nature of this war, which was distinctive, framing the intensity that makes this particular 
conflict so interesting. One of the best examples of this interest is seen in the massive series, 
entitled Germany and the Second World War, by the Bundeswehr’s history office. Published 
starting in 1979 and first translated in 1990, the thirteen-volume work involves many of 
Germany’s premier experts and examines the entirety of the Second World War, a substantial 
portion of which is devoted to Germany’s war with the Soviet Union. This understanding of the 
singular nature of the war was also a primary topic at issue during the trials that immediately 
followed the end of the war, particularly the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, as 
well as the subsequent Nuremberg Military Tribunal. These trials focused on the practical results 
of the ideology of National Socialism, specifically the charges of aggressive war, genocide and 
other crimes against humanity. As a result, the Wehrmacht was a key topic throughout the trials. 
This is indicated by the fact that four of those twenty-four indicted at the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal were career Wehrmacht officers.
5
 The inclusion of the German military in this trial 
sparked the beginning of a discussion regarding the role of the Wehrmacht in the National 
Socialist state.  
The more information came out concerning the actions of the Third Reich both prior to 
and during the Second World War – the source often these very trials – the harder veterans of the 
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Wehrmacht attempted to separate and distinguish themselves from the Nazis. This is exemplified 
in the numerous memoirs, diaries and books written and published by these veterans, most 
notably by those in positions of power. Amongst the most well-known are those of the likes of 
General Heinz Guderian, General Walter Warlimont and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. In 
addition, prominent war diaries, such as those of General Franz Halder and Field Marshal Fedor 
von Bock provided further material to constructing postwar narratives.
6
 Together, these works 
form the foundation of the narrative of separate and honourable action that former members of 
the Wehrmacht attempted to create for it. In this effort, they attempted to distance themselves 
from the close relationship developed between the person of Adolf Hitler and the Wehrmacht as 
an institution. It was in this literature that the concept known as the “clean” Wehrmacht first 
emerged. For example, Guderian at the end of his recollections asserts that soldiers (himself 
included) are fighters, not policy makers, further arguing that aggressive war was pushed on the 
military by politicians.
7
 Warlimont, a high-ranking officer at the OKW, similarly introduced his 
book by stating that the responsibility lay with Hitler and his top commanders, conveniently 
ignoring the fact that many would consider Warlimont himself to be one of those functionaries 
within the Wehrmacht.
8
 Even in death, Hitler’s shadow proved powerful, as well as a convenient 
scapegoat upon whom all sins could be placed. 
It has been noted by scholars that there was substantial acceptance of the notion of the 
“clean” Wehrmacht among early works on the topic of the German military’s interactions with 
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National Socialism. Some maintain that this was intended to help project and protect an image of 
a rehabilitated Germany.
9
 However, by the 1960s this trend was being challenged by such 
historians as Klaus-Jurgen Müller, who argued that the Wehrmacht willingly submitted to the 
increasing control of Hitler and the Nazis.
10
 A similar argument was made in other works, for 
example in Anatomy of the SS State by Helmut Krausnick, Hans Bucheim, Martin Broszat and 
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. Composed to provide evidence for a trial of SS men in Germany, this 
book apportioned blame to the Wehrmacht, especially against the Soviet Union, where the 
military showed itself willing to submit to ideology and fight for it.
11
 This has continued in more 
contemporary writing, for example with Omer Bartov, whose two works on the subject have 
strongly emphasized the impact of ideology on the Wehrmacht, although his focus is on front-
line units.
12
 Other works, such as those of Isabel Hull and John Horne have highlighted examples 
of German brutality against civilians predating the Second World War, specifically examining 
how the organization formalized treatment of civilians in colonial experiences, as well as the 
First World War. Their research indicates that the “military culture” of the German Army had 
long been based in wanton violence against civilians under its control and a general disregard for 
international conventions on the topic, a culture that the Wehrmacht inherited.
13
 In a similar vein, 
books by Alexander Rossino and Raffael Scheck examine the campaigns conducted by the 
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Wehrmacht under National Socialism, highlighting the reality that the outbreak of brutality did 
not suddenly begin in the Soviet Union, but occurred first in Poland and France, respectively.
14
 
Ideology and Social History: A Bottom-Up View 
Although a contentious issue in the decades immediately after the Second World War, the 
notion that ideology influenced the Landsers (the general infantry soldiers of the Wehrmacht) is 
no longer widely disputed. Rather, it is today a question of degree.
15
 In order to help clarify this 
question, there exists a plethora of documents detailing the views and experiences of many 
ordinary soldiers who served in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, providing a rich source 
base with which to study the topic.
16
 This has conveniently intersected with the rise of social 
history, which, in the context of military history, emphasizes the role of the average person on 
the front line. Such studies are important for realizing that an ideological mindset and attitude 
were more common than the rarities they have been sometimes construed to be. The convergence 
of this perspective with the counterinsurgency in the Soviet Union revolves around primary 
groups, of which military units around the world are comprised. These primary groups represent 
the chief contact point for the average soldier with others around them, and it is these groups that 
form the social bonds through which soldiers are inducted into a particular military culture. On 
this topic, historians such as Bartov argue that these groups were broken down by the attrition 
sustained on the Eastern Front, and that the Wehrmacht resorted to ideology to maintain 
cohesion, which in turn led to brutalization.  
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This emphasis on cohesion was in large part a response to the early research done by 
Shils and Janowitz on this topic conducted shortly after the end of the war. Based on their study, 
they concluded that the veteran cores of these groups were the fundamental source of the 
Wehrmacht’s cohesion and fighting power throughout the war. Their research, however, does not 
focus on the role of ideology within this context.
17
 Arguing that these groups were strained rather 
than broken, this research has been supported more recently, for example, by Cristoph Rass. 
Rass, however, has argued that in addition to socializing newer soldiers into combat, these cores 
also had an ideological impact as a result of the brutality of the conflict and the growing 
influence of National Socialist ideology within the Wehrmacht.
18
 The result of this was that the 
encouragement of violence, already the primary purpose of military socialization, became 
combined with ruthlessness. This discussion, while not the topic of this paper, forms a significant 
part of the research in this area. Focusing almost exclusively on the social historical perspective 
of the average soldier’s experience, there is no clear consensus on this topic. Regardless, it does 
appear that ideology played a role in shaping the military culture of the Wehrmacht during this 
time, affecting Landsers at the tip of the spear right up to the highest-ranking commanders. 
Occupation and Counterinsurgency 
On the topic of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union, there is a vast and growing 
historiography. Alexander Dallin’s German Rule in Russia remains a cornerstone work on the 
topic. His emphasis, however, is the administration of the occupied territories; he examines the 
Wehrmacht as only one of many power players, and he only briefly discusses the influence of 
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 Another early work, published shortly after Dallin’s, came from British historian 
Gerald Reitlinger. Focusing more on the Wehrmacht’s role in the occupation as well as the 
ideological impact, Reitlinger was nevertheless dismissive of Hitler and his ideology, describing 
his pronounced anti-Slavism as “characteristically Austrian and lower middle class at that.”
20
 
Another work, written by Matthew Cooper and published in 1979, also studied the topic of the 
German occupation and counterinsurgency from the perspective of ideology, suggesting that its 
influence worsened during the partisan war.
21
 His examination of this topic is reflected in 
comparable studies, such as John A. Armstrong’s edited compilation on the topic.
22
 As a 
relatively small part of the oft-neglected Eastern Front over previous decades, the partisan war 
has been increasingly acknowledged as forming a key component of the Second World War. 
In the past three decades, there has been a spate of good scholarship on the topic of the 
German occupation and counterinsurgency in the Soviet Union. Among the first in this period 
was Timothy Patrick Mulligan’s The Politics of Illusion and Empire. Although he examined the 
topic from the perspective of administration, with a particular emphasis on the realities and effect 
of reform, Mulligan’s work does examine this perspective with regards to the 
counterinsurgency.
23
 He does note that many of the “reforms,” particularly with regard to the 
Wehrmacht, were framed by ideology. As a result, Mulligan argues, their impression was often 
counterproductive, citing for example the November 11, 1942 counterinsurgency directive that 
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advocated for both leniency and brutality.
24
 The next and – aside from Dallin’s book – most 
important study of the Wehrmacht occupation came from Theo J. Schulte. His book is among the 
first to focus specifically on the military’s role in the rear areas. Looking in detail at two rear 
area commands in Army Group Center from an operational perspective, Schulte argues that the 
forces designated for the task of establishing quiet in the rear were inadequate in both quality and 
quantity.
25
 Although he does examine the influence that ideology had on the Wehrmacht, he 




More recently, three works have added further detail in specific studies of the German 
counterinsurgency. The first, by Ben Shepherd, argues in similar veins to Schulte’s study, 
although it deviates notably on the issue of ideological impact. This book examines the 
Wehrmacht’s entanglement with National Socialism from the viewpoint of a security division in 
the Soviet Union. Shepherd suggests that this interaction was largely willing from the military 
perspective, based on what the Wehrmacht hoped to gain via the Nazis. This melding radicalized 
the conduct of the war against the Soviet Union. Shepherd contextualizes this situation with the 
realities experienced in the occupation, arguing that the counterinsurgency was made ineffective 
by the weakness of the Wehrmacht efforts in the rear and the ruthlessness stemming from the 
ideology.
27
 Alexander Hill examines partisan war from within the context of the experience of 
Army Group North. He suggests that while harsh German policies did in fact initially limit the 
populace’s interaction with the partisans, this ultimately resulted in alienation and defeat in the 
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 The last work in this category, written by Philip Blood, examines the 
Bandenbekämpfung (bandit fight) and the expansion of the SS’s role in the counterinsurgency.
29
 
In this study, the Wehrmacht is only studied as a peripheral ally to the SS in this fight. From 
these sources it is apparent that the partisan war in the Soviet Union is increasingly becoming a 
mainstream topic of research. This recent growth in the literature has been supported by 




This paper is written as a top-down study for two main reasons. First of all, this is 
because available source material is more conducive to such a format. Diaries and journals of 
lower-ranking soldiers recording their experiences are enlightening, but they are limited in their 
scope and perspective, as well as the quantity available. This does not lend itself well to the 
summative narrative constructed in this paper. For such a task, strategic-level and command-
centric documents offer a better view of events as a whole. This manifests itself primarily in this 
paper as a reliance on documents gleaned from the Nuremberg trials. Focusing in part, as they 
were, on the Wehrmacht’s role in Nazi Germany, strong evidentiary support can be found there 
for the planning and actions against the Soviet Union by the military, including occupation 
efforts. This compilation of documentary evidence enables one to perceive and communicate a 
clearer picture of the events and mindsets behind actions taken. It does not, however, offer a 
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definitive and universal picture of the beliefs and mindsets of individual soldiers, and this is not 
the intended purpose of this research. These documents have been supplemented, where possible, 
by additional primary source material from other areas and prior secondary research conducted 
by others on this topic.  
The second and more important reason for the adoption of this perspective is the fact that 
in the context of a military hierarchy, where orders and plans originate in the upper echelons and 
are sent down, an understanding of the decision-making command levels is vital. This was even 
more so the case within the German context, stemming from the nature of the prewar relationship 
between the Wehrmacht and the National Socialist state as headed by Hitler. This relationship 
was central in shaping the context of subsequent actions. Hitler’s role as head of both the state 
and army were heavily intertwined with each other. This was made more distinctive by the 
nature of his style of rule, explained by one prominent historian as “charismatic” leadership, 
wherein Hitler remained as leader, but shifted responsibility onto subordinates.
31
 This 
perspective is helpful in clarifying the roles of not just Hitler, but also those around him. While 
Hitler himself remains as a secondary focus in this paper, intended as it is to examine the acts 
and actions of his subordinates, this notion of agency by all parties provides an important 
framework. Hitler acted, and remained in overall control, but underlings also had responsibilities 
and decision-making authority. Amidst rearmament in the 1930s, Hitler was able to gain more 
direct control of the Wehrmacht via the establishment of the OKW, which replaced the Ministry 
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of Defense and provided Hitler a mouthpiece to issue orders. With the ideological and 
existentialist framework of the war against the Soviet Union, Hitler’s perspective, mostly a 
compilation of pre-existing ideas, provides a necessary foundation to understanding the orders 























CHAPTER TWO: HITLER AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY 
National Socialism and the Soviet Union 
As the Red Army stormed Berlin in April 1945 in the final days of the Third Reich, Hitler 
dictated his final political testament, an epilogue to both his leadership of Germany and the 
ideology that drove him. In the face of this ultimate defeat, Hitler continued to propagate his 
ideology from an underground bunker. Recorded the day before he committed suicide, his 
testimony placed blame for the war squarely on “international Jewry”. He was, however, 
confident enough to claim that inevitably hatred would again rise out of the ruins of Germany 
towards those who were truly responsible: Jewry and “its helpers.”
32
 It is worth noting that while 
this testimony mentions both England and the USA, nothing is said of the Soviet Union, the very 
country whose military was primarily responsible for breaking the Wehrmacht in the Second 
World War and ultimately capturing Berlin. Despite this lack of acknowledgement, it was never 
a doubt in Hitler’s mind that the Soviet Union was the ultimate racial antithesis of Aryan 
Germany. Ruled, he alleged, by Jews – who doubled as the Bolsheviks in Hitler’s view – and 
populated by primitive Slavs, the Soviet Union was among the greatest of “accomplices” of 
International Jewry. In the conclusion of his testimony Hitler calls the German nation to continue 
the race war, declaring “I charge the leaders of the nation and those under them to scrupulous 
observance of the laws of race and to merciless opposition to the universal poisoner of all 
peoples, international Jewry.”
33
 To Hitler, conflict was inevitable as long as there existed 
different races, and in his Weltanschauung this was nowhere truer than in the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and Germany. 
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Hitler’s mindset on this topic is most apparent in his “Barbarossa” Proclamation. Issued 
the day that Germany’s massive invasion of the Soviet Union began, Hitler therein clarified the 
real purpose of the attack: 
National Socialists! 
Probably all of you felt this step was bitter and difficult for me. Never has the 
German Volk harbored feelings of animosity against the peoples of Russia. Alas, 
for over two decades, the Jewish-Bolshevik rulers have labored from Moscow to 
set afire not only Germany, but also all of Europe. Never has Germany attempted 
to carry its National Socialist ideology into Russia. However, the Jewish-
Bolshevik rulers in Moscow have constantly undertaken to force their rule on our 
and other European peoples, and not merely ideologically, but especially in terms 
of military force and power. In all countries, the consequences of the activities of 
this regime were chaos, misery, and famine … The mission of this front, 
therefore, is no longer the protection of individual countries, but the securing of 
Europe and, hence, the salvation of all.
34
 
Justified as a pre-emptory defensive action against the inherently aggressive and destructive Jew-
run Soviet Union for the good of all of Europe, the invasion was framed as an existentialist 
conflict between two dichotomous worldviews. A zero-sum struggle such as this was bound to 
be brutal and fought outside of the rules of war; survival supersedes legal niceties. This 
understanding of the conflict against the Soviet Union as one for existence itself stems from a 
Social Darwinist framework of race, struggle and survival that was at the very heart of National 
Socialism, the ideology formulated and shaped primarily by Hitler during the interwar period. 
These ideas had been clearly expressed long before the Second World War began, and evidently 
they remained true at the very least to Hitler himself until the last days of the Third Reich. While 
it is possible to write off Hitler’s ideas as simply racist and power-hungry, a more nuanced 
understanding is vital in order to contextualize the beliefs and subsequent actions of the Third 
Reich and the Wehrmacht in their war against the Soviet Union. After all, as one scholar aptly 
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put it, “War was the genesis and aim of Nazi actions.”
35
 Hitler’s own writings can thus illuminate 
the roots of German occupation policies.  
Race and Purity 
Hitler’s primary writing, Mein Kampf, explains his political views. One of the most 
important of these was his perception of race struggle and the supremacy of the Aryans. National 
Socialism, employing what one scholar describes as an “embattled vision of history,” views all 
human existence as being fundamentally based in struggle. The logical solution was to make the 
German people “unassailable.”
36
 For Hitler, race was a simple matter of the superiority of the 
Aryan, to whom he attributed “all the human culture, all the results of art, science, and 
technology.”
37
 Based on this understanding of race, Hitler defines three separate racial 
categories: those that create culture, those that bear culture and those that destroy culture. In this 
way, Hitler establishes the basis of his understanding of race and the resultant hierarchy. Placing 
only Aryans in the first and most important category, Hitler advances his argument for the 
preservation of these culture-creators over all others.
38
 The only way to protect the race, and thus 
human culture, was actually two-fold: first, to maintain racial purity by avoiding “blood 
poisoning”, and second by fighting in “this world of eternal struggle.”
39
 Based on that 
interpretation, the only way to ensure the survival of human culture was to ensure racial 
cleanliness and victory in struggle. Thus, the primary goal of National Socialism was to revive 
the national spirit, thereby making Germany stronger and more united in their common cause of 
sustaining the Aryan race in the coming conflict.
40
 On this understanding, politics ultimately 
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becomes the fight for race preservation “so that life in the highest sense is served.”
41
 As Aryans 
were the highest-value race on account of their singular culture-creating capabilities, National 
Socialism is predicated on the concept of “ends-justify-the-means” morality: whatever is useful 
for the survival of the race is moral. The intention here was to preserve the Aryan race at all 
costs, and beyond that to make the nation powerful. “Germany,” Hitler declared, “will either be a 
world power or there will be no Germany.”
42
 An existentialist dichotomy of race had thus been 
created.  
The Jews 
Nowhere was such racial protection more evident than in Hitler’s perception of the Jews. 
He begrudgingly acknowledged that “The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by 
the Jew.”
43
 The Jewish race was here perceived as being antithetical to the Aryan: where the 
latter created life and culture, the former destroyed. The Jewish capacity and willingness to 
corrupt others socially, economically and racially was innate, on Hitler’s view.
44
 The greatest 
manifestation of this corruption was in their invention of Marxism, understood by Hitler as the 
harnessing of the worker to fight for the future of the Jewish people.
45
 Utilizing the cover of 
communal humanism, Marxism was seen by Hitler as fundamentally serving the Jewish attempt 
at world domination and the destruction of culture. The real impact of this ideology was to reject 
individuality and personality via the creation of a global egalitarian community, and thereby 
shatter the concept of race. The result, the “bastardization” of race, enabled Jews to rule for “he 
will forever be master over the bastards and bastards alone.”
46
 The threat presented by the Jewish 
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race, then, had two central and interconnected thrusts: racial corruption, and social and economic 
discord. These, Hitler asserted, could both be found embodied in their Marxist ideology.   
In his writings, Hitler indicates that this deceptive nature was at the heart of the real 
threat represented by this Jewish-Marxist conglomerate, stating that 
Only a knowledge of the Jews provides the key with which to comprehend the 
inner, and consequently real, aims of Social Democracy. 
The erroneous conceptions of the aim and meaning of this party fall from our eyes 
like veils, once we come to know this people and from the fog and mist of social 
phrases rises the leering grimace of Marxism.
47
 
It is generally accepted that Hitler borrowed much of his ideology from the prominent Völkisch 
concept that advocated for racial purity, pan-German unity, anti-Semitism and anti-Marxism.
48
 
Even his conflation of Marxism with Jews was not exclusive or original. However, it was 
convenient to scapegoat the Jews and to lump left-wing politicians together with them. Thus, 
Hitler’s conception of Jews as a “pestilence,” combined with the revolutionary and disruptive 
nature of Marxism, had a profound effect.
49
 It served to create a potent mixture of fear and hatred 
that would wield substantial influence in Hitler’s future policy decisions. Later on, the evidence 
he offers to justify this viewpoint is the experience of Germany in the First World War. Not only 
had the Jews shirked front line duty in favour of war profiteering – a bad enough crime on its 
own – but the Jewish-led Marxists had also disrupted and then taken control of the home front. It 
was thus the Jewish-Marxist conspiracy that humiliated Germany and crippled the nation in 
Hitler’s eyes, bringing defeat on Germany from within.
50
 Taking this notion to its logical 
extreme Hitler suggests that the gassing of twelve to fifteen thousand “Hebrew corrupters” prior 
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to and during the war would have saved the war effort and meant the loss of millions of Germans 
was not in vain.
51
 Reflecting on this, he concludes that “There is no making pacts with Jews; 
there can only be the hard: either ― or.”
52
 Perceiving conflict as the most effective method for 
purifying and securing race, Hitler was adamant that there was no room for equivocation with 
lesser races, particularly in this case the Jews.  
 Hitler viewed the Jew as the ultimate enemy of Germany; furthermore, citing the Jewish 
impulse to world conquest, he suggests that “As often in history, Germany is the great pivot in 
the mighty struggle. If our people and our state become the victim of these bloodthirsty and 
avaricious Jewish tyrants of nations, the whole earth will sink into the snares of this octopus; if 
Germany frees herself from this embrace, this greatest of dangers to nations may be regarded as 
broken for the whole world.”
53
 Responsibility for the continuation of culture and humanity itself, 
rather than enslavement and racial debasement, was placed squarely on Germany. It was 
apparent that the war would truly begin with Germany, as the primary hub of the Aryan race. 
This further implied that resistance to the Jews and Marxism would culminate in a war for world 
domination and the victory of one race. This automatically made the Soviet Union – the first 
state in which Jewish-Marxism was able to establish full control – the primary enemy of 
Germany. Hitler made this clear when he stated that “In Russian Bolshevism we must see the 
attempt undertaken by the Jews in the twentieth century to achieve world domination.”
54
 
Worsening this situation, the “infinite chasm” between Slavs and the Nordic Aryans had further 
deteriorated with the revolutionary takeover of the Jewish-Bolsheviks.
55
 The only bridge over 
this chasm had been the intelligentsia, which Hitler understood to be non-Slavic in “racial 
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character.” When this was removed by the Bolsheviks, there was nothing giving Slavs 
compatibility with Aryans.
56
 In this way the value, and thus importance of the Slavs was entirely 
removed, leaving their fate to be determined by the needs of Aryan survival. 
Despite the threat of the Soviet Union and the lack of potential allies there, Hitler was 
confident that this was to Germany’s advantage. If anything, the Bolshevik revolution had 
removed the thin veneer that had kept Russia connected to the rest of Europe. Beyond that, it had 
also removed any illusion that Russia could be a functional state. The nation now comprised 
uneducated and illiterate Slav masses serving as slaves to the “Jewish dictators.”
57
 Given the 
inherent destructiveness of Jewry, combined with the inability of Slavs to operate a state, “it is 
good fortune for the future that this development has taken place in just this way because thereby 
a spell has been broken which would have prevented us from seeking the goal of German foreign 
policy there where it solely and exclusively can lie: territory in the East.”
58
 In Hitler’s mind, it 
was not a question of if, but when, the Soviet Union would collapse from within. Too few 
elements of positive racial and cultural creation existed there, in tandem with too many 
destructive elements. Conveniently, Hitler’s racial and ideological foci largely aligned in the 
Soviet Union, where Germany’s existence could be ensured by both removing the primary 
enemies of and securing a future for the German Aryans.  
Lebensraum 
 Hitler’s concept of Lebensraum (living space), first proposed by the nineteenth century 
German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, is best understood as a response to an alleged land 
shortage. Presuming the existence of such a shortage, Hitler called for Germany to focus on 
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gaining more territory by any means necessary. He argued that “We must not let political 
boundaries obscure for us the boundaries of eternal justice. If this earth really has room for all to 
live in, let us be given the soil we need for our livelihood.”
59
 The immediate issue with this 
perspective was that all potential territorial gains would have to come at the expense of other 
nation states. To Hitler the answer was apparent: “The law of self-preservation goes into effect; 
and what is refused to amicable methods, it is up to the fist to take.”
60
 His conclusion that 
overseas colonies were impractical given Germany’s naval vulnerabilities and the risk of 
endangering a potential alliance with England, meant that only European land was a viable 
option to acquire Lebensraum.
61
 The notion of acquiring sufficient land in Europe to enable the 
growth and continuation of the Aryan race thus represented the primary foreign policy goal of 
National Socialism: “The foreign policy of the folkish state must safeguard the existence on this 
planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable natural relation between the 
nation’s population and growth on the one hand and the quantity and quality of its soil on the 
other hand.”
62
 Sufficient land to feed the anticipated growth could not be acquired by means 
other than violence, indicating that National Socialism was fundamentally an ideology predicated 
on conflict. 
 Reversing the biblical prophecy, Hitler declares in his Secret Book that “The sword was 
the path-breaker for the plough.” He continues on, arguing that “this earth is not allotted to 
anyone, nor is it presented to anyone as a gift. It is awarded by Providence to people who in their 
hearts have the courage to take possession of it, the strength to preserve it, and the industry to put 
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it to the plough.”
63
 Applying Social Darwinism in a framework of might makes right, Hitler 
identifies conflict as the unavoidable path to resolving Lebensraum. Survival of the fittest and 
natural selection both factor heavily in his mindset.
64
 The alternative, to allow the course of races 
to continue as their established national boundaries dictated, did not bode well for those better 
humans. Hitler said as much when he declares that “The culturally superior, but less ruthless 
races, would in consequence of their limited soil, have to limit their increase at a time when the 
culturally inferior but more brutal and more natural peoples, in consequence of their greater 
living areas, would still be in a position to increase without limit. In other words: some day the 
world will thus come into possession of the culturally inferior but more active men.”
65
 To reverse 
this trend, force alone would be able to solve the problem. 
 Hitler, envisioning the acquisition of half a million, or even a million square kilometers 
for the expansion of Germany, anticipated homes for millions of Germans. With overseas 
colonies or alternative solutions ruled out, the logical conclusion was that Russia was the only 
viable place in Europe to seize sufficient land. As a result, Hitler identifies the building of 
Germany’s army as a primary goal, seeing as a rebuilt military would provide the means to 
achieving this purpose.
66
 More important than quantity, however, was quality, in both race value 
and land fertility. Identifying the United States as a powerful state, Hitler argues that this is the 
case because of a large number of racially superior people inhabiting a vast amount of high-
quality land. This same understanding explained why Russia was not comparably dangerous, 
given the drastically lower value of the races present there.
67
 Given the same land, however, the 
future of the Aryans was full of potential. For Hitler it was a simple matter of survive or die. 
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“Whoever will not be a hammer in history,” he argues, “will be an anvil.”
68
 As a result, the focus 
of National Socialism was to mobilize and lead the German people to secure the necessary space 
for the continued growth and success of the Aryan race.
69
  
 Lebensraum, as the embodiment of an ideology both racial and political in nature, was 
the primary focus of the National Socialism Weltanschauung. This relied heavily on a utilitarian 
model for both morality and action. Hitler states that foreign policy is ultimately determined by 
“the necessity to secure the space necessary to the life of our people,” establishing the foundation 
of a framework that he was to utilize throughout his rule.
70
 Assuming the absolute importance of 
gaining space, Hitler makes it clear that whatever means served that end were acceptable. This 
also shapes his understanding of the role of the state, describing it in the following way: “The 
highest purpose of a folkish state is concern for the preservation of those original racial elements 
which bestow culture and create the beauty and dignity of a higher mankind.”
71
 As the securing 
of Lebensraum served to ensure the growth and survival of the German people, the achievement 
of that goal was the end; the means to that end were entirely flexible and open. Victory in 
struggle to gain space was the only way to ensure survival. In this zero-sum scenario, being 
humane and following international laws would only hinder this victory, which was the ultimate 
goal of both the race and the state. The implications of this mindset were to be experienced 
primarily in the all-encompassing conflict that was at the heart of National Socialism. 
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CHAPTER THREE: PREPARING FOR “BARBAROSSA” 
The Beginning of Planning 
Following the beginning of the Second World War with the invasion of Poland on 
September 1, 1939, and the stunningly successful invasion of France and the Low Countries, 
there were many within Germany who expected the war to end. With Britain the only remaining 
great power still in the war, even Hitler had visions of final victory. However, as early as the 
middle of July, 1940, only three weeks after the signing of an armistice with France, there was 
instead confusion. “The Fuehrer,” OKH Chief of the General Staff Halder noted, “is greatly 
puzzled by Britain’s persisting unwillingness to make peace.” Even at this early stage, however, 
both Hitler and Halder agreed that the answer lay in Russia, whom they assumed was aligning 
itself with England so as to weaken Germany.
72
 Although the operational focus remained on 
England and how to defeat that island nation, Hitler increasingly turned his eyes to the east, to a 
military solution against Russia. On July 22, 1940, Halder notes the first operational plans 
against Russia, suggesting a general outline for a limited strike to provide strategic advantages 
requiring 80-100 German divisions.
73
 At this early stage a prolonged war was not envisioned by 
the OKH, and the attack on the Soviet Union was intended to cripple that threat and at the same 
time increase the pressure on England to surrender.  
Hitler had never had faith in peace in the east, as noted in a memorandum from October 
9, 1939 to the commanders of the three branches of the Wehrmacht, as well as Keitel, the OKW 
Chief. Soviet neutrality could not be guaranteed by any agreement, the memo argued. Due to this 
fact, the best solution was a “demonstration of German strength.”
74
 This flew in the face of the 
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Non-Aggression Pact agreed to by the two nations less than two months prior. Hitler reaffirmed 
this mindset in November, when he spoke to the same commanders to whom the earlier 
memorandum had been sent. “Pacts, however,” the notes of the speech record, “are only held as 
long as they serve the purpose.”
75
 The perception here was that the agreement was a temporary 
solution to avoiding a two-front war, a great fear of German military planning throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The notion of the Soviet Union as the linchpin of 
Germany’s war effort was a strong and common theme throughout the planning phase. “With 
Russia smashed,” Halder wrote in recording Hitler’s thoughts, “Britain’s last hope would be 
shattered. Germany then will be master of Europe and the Balkans. Decision: Russia’s 
destruction must therefore be made a part of this struggle. Spring 41.”
76
 While the seizure of vast 
tracts of land had quickly become the primary goal, the strategic means to that end was to 
definitively smash the Soviet Union, as that was the only way to achieve victory. This entailed 
the “destruction of Russian manpower.” Only a few days after estimating 80-100 German 
divisions, the estimated force required for this task had now jumped to 120.
77
 The day prior to 
this meeting Halder had agreed with Walter von Brauchitsch, Army Commander-in-Chief, that 
peace with Russia was preferable to a two-front war. In the meeting itself, however, there was no 
opposition to Hitler’s proposed destruction of the Soviet Union.
78
 
The Führer conference on December 5, 1940 was a major moment in the planning of the 
invasion of the Soviet Union. The strategic goals stated there aided in the alignment of National 
Socialist ideology with Wehrmacht operations. The destruction of the Red Army west of the 
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Dnieper River was seen as of vital importance.
79
 This would enable Germany to secure the 
necessary land to achieve strategic depth and strike Soviet “war potential,” meaning industry and 
raw material production.
80
 Jürgen Förster has convincingly argued that this strategy combined 
the National Socialist concept of Lebensraum with the strategy of short and decisive wars, 
describing it as a “symbiosis of rational thought and dogma.”
81
 Hans Bucheim reinforces this 
argument when he asserts that “As Führer Hitler was also Supreme Commander; basically 
therefore he had every possibility of dressing up ideological orders as military ones and then 
laying claim to the legitimate duty of the soldier to obey, a duty stemming from the general 
obligations of any citizen.”
82
 The annihilation aspect of the plan also fit well within both the 
ideological and military perspectives. This same sentiment was expressed in detail in Hitler’s 
War Directive No. 21 for “Case Barbarossa”, issued on December 18, which called for a rapid 
armoured advance intended to destroy first the Red Army and then the Soviet Union’s ability to 
wage war.
83
 Setting the start date of the invasion as May 15, 1941, Hitler moved from simply 
planning for a future hypothetical, to actively ordering the German military to prepare for the 
invasion, set to begin in six months.  
 The call for a strategic-level armoured encirclement of the Red Army west of the Dnieper 
amounts to what is best understood as the desire to implement Blitzkrieg-style warfare on the 
entire invasion front against the Soviet Union. Karl-Heinz Frieser suggests that many in the 
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Wehrmacht, Halder included, experienced “blitzkrieg mania” due to the stunning successes of 
German armoured warfare in the first years of the war.
84
 Both he and Ian Kershaw agree that 
much of the power of the concept was derived from the National Socialist Führer mythos around 
Hitler himself, itself seemingly demonstrated by the unbroken chain of German military 
successes up to mid-1941.
85
 While the annihilation envisioned by the planned armoured 
encirclements served to achieve both the violence called for by ideology, as well as the decisive 
victory in military doctrine – thus making it ideal – there was a significant threat from adopting 
this model. As Frieser himself argues, modern industrial-scale war is decided primarily on 
economic and strategic depth, rather than operational success, and the Blitzkrieg concept fell 
squarely within the latter.
86
 These weaknesses were obscured by rapid and shocking victories 
against other countries. In other words, though Germany may have held the operational 
advantage in modernized military capability, the Soviet Union held the advantage where it 
mattered – in depth. This meant, first of all, that those tip-of-the-spear armoured forces would 
experience significant attrition, which would endanger German efforts if the conflict became 
drawn-out. Second, given the highly-disruptive nature of this form of warfare over such a vast 
space, rear-area security was both paramount to provide sufficient logistical support, and also 
open to great vulnerability. As with the invasion itself, an extended campaign would only worsen 
this state of affairs. The tenets of both military necessity and National Socialist ideology 
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advocated for maximum ferocity so as to ensure a swift and complete victory, a hindrance for 
both the invasion and occupation in the event of a longer conflict.
87
  
 Despite some concerns regarding the risks involved and skepticism over potential gains 
from “Barbarossa”, Wehrmacht planning continued in 1941.
88
 Distrust of the “gigantic block” of 
the Soviet Union largely stemmed from the fact that if Stalin, who Hitler perceived as 
“intelligent and careful,” was removed, Jews would take over, implying war could be the only 
result.
89
 Halder noted that Hitler felt conflict with the Soviet Union was inevitable and that the 
Bolshevik state had to be eliminated first.
90
 Participants of a conference with Hitler in mid-
March nevertheless expressed uncertainties regarding the reception of Germany by the various 
ethnic groups there. What was certain, however, was that the Soviet-established intelligentsia in 
the broader Soviet Union and Soviet “functionaries” in Russia proper, as distinct from the 
Ukraine and Belarus, needed to be eliminated. “The controlling machinery of the Russian 
Empire must be smashed,” and in Russia proper, “force must be used in its most brutal form. The 
ideological ties holding together the Russian people are not yet strong enough …”
91
 The glue of 
Soviet rule in both Russia and the other areas was thus perceived to be exclusively imperialistic 
Bolshevik ideology as propagated by Soviet minions. While it is unclear who exactly made these 
remarks at the conference, what is clear is that there was a growing consensus between Hitler 
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The Criminal Orders 
On March 30, 1941, Hitler explained the ideological implications of the invasion of the 
Soviet Union to the Wehrmacht’s top commanders.
93
 At this pivotal meeting he laid out both the 
ideological justification for, and the necessary responses to this entirely distinctive enemy that 
the Wehrmacht was about to engage with. While attending that conference Halder summarized 
the contents of Hitler’s comments on the essence of the forthcoming war: 
Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation of Bolshevism, identified with 
asocial criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for our future. We must 
not forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no 
comrade before nor after battle. This is a war of extermination. If we do not grasp 
this, we shall still beat the enemy, but 30 years later we shall again have to fight 
the Communist foe. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy… 
War against Russia: Extermination of the Bolshevist Commissars and of the 
Communist intelligentsia… This is no job for Military Courts. The individual 
troop commanders must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in this 
fight. The troops must fight back with the methods with which they are attacked. 
Commissars and GPU men are criminals and must be dealt with as such. This 
need not mean that the troops should get out of hand. Rather, the commander 
must give orders which express the common feelings of his men. 
This war will be very different from the war in the West. In the East, harshness 
today means lenience in the future. Commanders must make the sacrifice of 
overcoming their personal scruples.
94
 
According to Hitler’s speech, this new type of warfare was to be accompanied by a new, more 
brutal response. Based on that assumption, the reply was to be embodied in the special orders, 
directives and guidelines issued in preparation for warfare against the Soviet Union, known 
collectively to posterity as the Criminal Orders. The next day, the OKH issued the first draft of 
the notorious Commissar Order, the first in this set of Orders.
95
 Ideology and military planning 
were now being joined together with tangible results. By briefing the commanders of the 
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invasion of its political implications, Hitler, laid the groundwork for ideological preparations of 
the Wehrmacht. 
 This meeting did not spark the beginning of such ideological planning. In fact the first of 
these ideological preparations began several weeks prior to the March 30 conference, when the 
Wehrmacht clarified its duties related to security in the occupied territories, ceding some 
authority to the SS, itself a wing of the NSDAP and thus inherently ideological. On March 5, the 
OKW circulated a draft of the directive regarding the administration of the occupied regions. 
Halder, in discussing the agreement, cryptically notes that “Special missions of the Reichsfuehrer 
SS,” had also been given.
96
 Referring to Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS and German police, 
this is the first time a distinctive role for the SS in the invasion had been noted by those planning 
it. The OKW “Directives for Special Areas to Order #21 (Case Barbarossa)” – of March 13 – 
indicates that the Wehrmacht perceived this ideological force – described by one historian as 
“Modern, racially up-to-date, and lethally anti-Semitic” ‒ to be useful for the administration and 
pacification of the occupied Soviet territories.
97
 Furthermore, the very authority of the SS over 
the German state security apparatus signified that National Socialism and the security of the 
German state were inseparable. That same day Wehrmacht Quartermaster Eduard Wagner and 
Reinhard Heydrich began discussing the details of this delineation between the SS and the 
Wehrmacht.
98
 The SS was quickly becoming an irreplaceable facet of occupation security in the 
Soviet Union. 
The real substance of this delineation came in May, first when another directive clarified 
that although army and army group commanders retained some authority to limit the activity of 
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the Einsatzgruppen, these special units had their own tasks to complete. These tasks revolved 
primarily around the rounding up and execution of ideological enemies. In completing those 
goals, they were not to be hindered. Comprised of Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service – SS 
intelligence and security organization) and Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) troops, the 
Einsatzgruppen were subordinated to Heydrich as head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt
 
 
(RSHA – Reich Main Security Office).
99
 This control stemmed from the fact that the German 
security apparatus had been concentrated under Himmler’s leadership as both Reichsführer-SS 
and Chief of the German Police.
100
 The second clarification was the Wagner-Heydrich 
agreement in the middle of May in which Wagner – as the OKH’s Quartermaster-General, in 
charge of both supply and rear areas at that time – and Heydrich, agreed that the Wehrmacht 
would support the Einsatzgruppen and that the RSHA would have complete authority over these 
units in all but the front-line operational zones.
101
 Although the main issue in these documents 
was the clarification of authority structures, Ernst Klink has argued that any Wehrmacht 
concerns regarding the separation of authority and the risk of interference by National Socialism 
or its adherents were cast aside in the event that security in the rear of the military was 
compromised.
102
 Even though the perception seems to have been that these Einsatzgruppen 
would help secure the rear areas, the context of ideological war – both racial and political – was 
already established, so the real intent of these units, though not explicitly stated in these orders, 
was obvious.  
 Around this same time Halder recorded another major meeting with important 
implications for the Wehrmacht’s occupation effort: 
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 Gen. z.b.V. Mueller, with Judge Advocate General [Lehmann]. 
Order to troops along lines of last Fuehrer address to the generals. Troops 
must do their share in the ideological struggle of the Eastern Campaign. 
Questions of administration of justice in the AGp. Rear Areas.
103
 
Referring to the conference with Hitler of March 30, the outcome of this meeting would become 
the “Decree for the Conduct of Courts-Martials in the District ‘BARBAROSSA’ and for Special 
Measures of the Troops”, or the Martial Jurisdiction Decree. Issued on May 13, the decree 
suggested that due to the nature of the war and opponents in the coming invasion, severity 
against Soviet civilians was to be the status quo. Signed by Keitel, it removed the jurisdiction of 
courts-martial from civilians, encouraged annihilation by the “most extreme means” of all 
resistance, permitted collective reprisals on battalion commander orders if individual perpetrators 
could not be found, and disseminated authority for executions down to any officer.
104
 One 
historian has characterized this plan as the pre-criminalization of the entire Soviet populace.
105
 
This decree further relieved the compulsion of prosecution for offenses committed by soldiers, 
justifying it based on the following reasoning: “While judging offenses of this kind, it should be 
considered in every case, that the break-down in 1918, the time of suffering of the German 
people after that, and the numerous blood sacrifices were decidedly due to the Bolshevist 
influence, and that no German has forgotten this.”
106
 Based in the popular “stab-in-the-back” 
theory propagated in Germany after the First World War, the solution as put forward here was 
the application of ruthless repression against a Soviet populace presumably affected by the 
Bolshevik ideology. 
In spite of the Wehrmacht’s apparent acceptance of the Decree, it seems that they were 
also aware of how drastically it violated the laws and customs of war. The civilian populace that 
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was to come under their jurisdiction in the Soviet Union was to be largely unprotected by legal 
means or military discipline, susceptible to extreme violence and excesses of every kind. As a 
result, two months later – five weeks into the invasion – the OKW ordered the destruction of all 
the Decree’s twenty-three copies. The stated purpose of this was to avoid it falling into enemy 
hands.
107
 However, the removal of the Decree in this way did not abolish the order or change the 
altered relationship between the Wehrmacht and the Soviet populace.
108
 The published version of 
the Martial Jurisdiction Decree approved by the OKH and OKW emphasized the necessary 
harshness based on the perceived ideological nature of the conflict. The Wehrmacht’s 
acknowledgement of the shaky legality of this decree is exemplified by the secrecy with which 
this decree was distributed and then subsequently hidden. In spite of this, the order was not 
revoked, and there is no indication that this decree faced significant resistance from Wehrmacht 
commanders on moral or ideological grounds. 
The one serious reservation the Wehrmacht did seem to have for this order concerned 
discipline amongst its own troops. The Decree justified suspension of courts-martial for crimes 
committed against civilians because of a shortage of staff, combined with the anticipated nature 
of war against the Soviet Union. Brauchitsch, however, apparently became concerned that the 
licence for swift justice given to low-ranking officers could ruin discipline. As a result, he 
attempted to alleviate the tone of the Martial Jurisdiction Decree. His supplement to the Decree, 
written on May 24, stated that “All counterintelligence measures of the troops will be carried out 
energetically, for their own security and the speedy pacification of the territory won … 
Movement and combat against the enemy’s armed forces are the real tasks of the troops … The 
directives of the Fuerhrer concern serious cases of rebellion, in which the most severe measures 
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 In an attempt to return the focus to conventional combat against the Red Army, 
Brauchitsch called on the commanders to maintain control and prevent excesses. Though this 
document was used in defense of Brauchitsch and the Wehrmacht as an attempt to countermand 
the Martial Jurisdiction Decree, it did not alter the Decree, and was sufficiently vague so as to 
contradict itself.
110
 Although excesses were to be avoided and discipline consequently 
maintained, the occupied areas had to be pacified by whatever means to make the Wehrmacht’s 
rear secure.
111
 Given that mercilessness was seen as the best way to achieve pacification, 
justification had been given to the troops to suppress any rebellion, real or otherwise, with 
utmost ferocity.  
During this time, on May 19, the OKW issued the Directives for the Behaviour of the 
Troops in Russia. This document was heavy with ideological implications, pointing to 
Bolshevism as the ultimate enemy of the German people, as well as the glue holding together the 
Soviet Union via primarily Jewish representatives.
112
 “This struggle requires ruthless and 
energetic action against Bolshevik agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs, and Jews, and the total 
elimination of all active or passive resistance,”
113
 the Directives stated. Amidst the Wehrmacht’s 
attempts to distribute and clarify exactly what the Martial Jurisdiction Decree implied for 
military operations, these Directives aligned all resistance with Bolsheviks and Jews, who were 
considered to be almost entirely synonymous. The response stems primarily from the existential 
nature of the enemy that the Bolsheviks, and by extension the Jews, represented to the German 
people. As a result, resistance of all kinds was to be supressed “totally”. By itself this document 
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offers a vague solution to resistance, but in the context of the other Criminal Orders and the 
military culture of the Wehrmacht, the intention of this OKW order becomes apparent. A 
prominent historian of the Final Solution has accurately described the theme of these Directives 
and the Martial Jurisdiction Decree as providing a “shooting license” for the troops.
114
 While 
these Directives had important consequences for the Wehrmacht’s occupation policies in the 
Soviet Union, they also shaped the final Criminal Order discussed here: that relating to the 
definition and treatment of commissars.  
 Despite the fact that the first draft of the Commissar Order did appear the day after the 
March 30 Führer Conference, it was not actually distributed in its final form until early June. 
While it went through multiple drafts, an examination of the drafts as compared to the published 
order reveals three major focal points. First, there was an effort to define what constituted a 
commissar, and subsequently how to handle them. The decision in this area was to execute all 
identified commissars, military and otherwise, as soon as possible.
115
 Second, Judge Advocate 
General Rudolf Lehmann explained that military courts were not to judge commissars. 
Responsibility for determining guilt was instead placed on regular commanders.
116
 Furthermore, 
this clause gave soldiers the right to kill commissars without fear of punishment of 
overzealousness. Finally, the order stated that non-military commissars apprehended in the rear 
were to be handed over to the Einsatzgruppen, presumably for immediate execution, while 
military commissars and those captured in the operational zones were to be taken care of by the 
Wehrmacht.
117
 Commissars were to be removed by all means necessary, the logic being that the 
Red Army’s resistance would simply crumble without these Bolshevik functionaries to motivate 
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them to fight. The methods for identifying such persons, however, were unclear at best, and this 
order offered another opportunity to use violence at will against prisoners. 
Keitel distributed this order – signed by Warlimont – on June 6. Warlimont clarified that 
the order was a direct attempt to fulfill the conditions set out in the Martial Jurisdiction 
Decree.
118
 Brauchitsch, who issued the order from the OKH, also added supplements to this 
order, although they were even less impactful than the one he issued regarding the Martial 
Jurisdiction Decree. His first clarification was that commissars be definitively identified as 
hostile or potentially so before they were executed or handed over to the Einsatzgruppen. The 
second was that executions be conducted in an orderly manner, specifically that they be ordered 
by officers, carried out “inconspicuously” and confined to areas outside combat zones.
119
 These 
supplements neither altered the orders in substance nor clarified precisely how the troops were to 
confidently identify commissars as hostile or possessing the potential to be so. The order itself 
justified the liquidation of commissars on the premise that they presented a threat – both 
ideologically and racially – and that their destruction would aid pacification. Given that, it was 
likely that the troops would adopt an attitude of pragmatism, in this case immediate execution, 
rather than a cautious and judicious application.  
 Referencing both the Martial Jurisdiction Decree and the Directives for the Behaviour of 
the Troops in Russia, the Commissar Order establishes the framework for acting against those 
identified as commissars. All thus identified who resisted or were suspected of resisting were to 
be segregated as quickly as possible and executed. This stemmed from the Wehrmacht’s 
understanding that “These commissars will not be recognized as soldiers; the protection granted 
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to prisoners of war in accordance with international law will not apply to them.”
120
 The 
judgement of the guilt or innocence of a commissar was to be determined primarily on the 
personal impression of the commissar’s “outlook and attitude”, rather than facts.
121
 Those 
commissars captured behind the operational zones, regardless of role, were to be turned over to 
the Einsatzgruppen, and military courts were to have no part in determining the guilt or 
innocence of suspects.
122
 Thus, the apparent glue of both the Red Army and the broader Soviet 
Union were to be targeted with the utmost severity, befitting the imposed nature of the conflict. 
Overall, the Criminal Orders must be understood to have provided the Wehrmacht’s basis for an 
existential conflict.
123
 The assessment that “The Commissar Order became an excuse for the 
wholesale murder of prisoners of war, but the ‘Barbarossa’ Jurisdiction Order justified the 
extermination of the civilian population,” seems accurate given what was endorsed via these 
orders and their supplements.
124
 The Commissar Order completed the ideological preparation of 
the Wehrmacht’s invasion, but the occupation as a whole had also been defined during this time. 
Plans for Administration 
 The occupation of the Soviet Union was not solely focused on resource extraction, but 
also on the establishment of Lebensraum, which required clearing most of the populace there. 
This was a central aspect of what is best known as Generalplan Ost, the Nazi vision of 
Germanizing and colonizing the European territories of the Soviet Union. The lead on this 
specific mission had been given in late 1939 to Himmler as part of his ever-expanding duties and 
powers. By the “Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor for the Strengthening of 
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Germanism” on October 7, 1939, Himmler was tasked with bringing all racial Germans into the 
Reich and creating German colonies via resettlement, by any means necessary, through the office 
of the Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germanism. Keitel signed this document, 
implying the potential role of the Wehrmacht in operations to achieve this purpose.
125
 Such 
operations were first undertaken in Poland, but the Soviet Union as the primary provider of 
Lebensraum was always the preferred target. Hitler, in a speech to the Reichstag the day before 
the issuance of this decree, had clarified that Germany’s goal was to create German unity from 
across Eastern and Southern Europe and thus “a new ordering of ethnographic relations.” This 
then was the mandate given to Himmler in this new role.
126
 Hitler’s mid-July 1941 conference, 
conducted in the midst of the first formulations of what would become Generalplan Ost, must be 
understood in light of the desire to clear Lebensraum for German settlement.
127
 
The debate over the interpretation of Hitler as either chiefly an ideologue or a pragmatist 
comes to the fore most notably in his invasion of the Soviet Union. Adam Tooze’s argument that 
German plans against the Soviet Union derived primarily from the economics of war does not 
prevent him from pointing to ideology’s prominence in Nazi plans for the Soviet Union.
128
 While 
Tooze, arguably incorrectly, subordinates ideology to economics in his assessment of the 
invasion’s motivations, the economics of the invasion also did play a prominent role in the 
occupation of the Soviet Union. In a directive issued on the eve of “Barbarossa”, based on the 
assumption of a swift victory over the Soviet Union and looking beyond, Hitler declared that 
“The newly conquered territories in the East must be organized, made secure and, in full 
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cooperation with the Armed Forces, exploited economically.”
129
 This territory and the resultant 
economic gain would fuel future operations targeting the Suez Canal, Gibraltar and West Africa, 
as well as England. In other words, the Soviet Union had become not just the linchpin of 
defeating England, but was expected to provide the necessary resources and strategic position to 
secure Germany’s dominance of Europe, Africa and the Middle East, and for that Hitler stated 
that the Lebensraum was to be cleared via “necessary measures,” such as executions and 
deportations. The resultant hierarchy of priorities was as follows: dominate, administer and 
exploit.
130
 Working from the assumption that vast tracts of the Soviet Union would be occupied 
and cleared of Untermenschen (sub-humans), German plans for occupation were oriented 
towards the “final settlement.” Plans for the utilization of the resources of the Soviet Union were 
thus both pragmatic and ideological in character at the same time. 
 In the Soviet Union the first priority, domination, would be achieved and maintained by 
the Wehrmacht in coordination with the SS and other security forces. The second, 
administration, would be primarily conducted by the newly-established ministry under Alfred 
Rosenberg. Initially designated as Hitler’s main administrator for the expected occupied 
territories in the Soviet Union on April 20, 1941, Rosenberg had already clarified his perception 
of an administration of the occupied areas based largely on ideology.
131
 In an April 2 memo, 
Rosenberg called for a clarification of the purposes of the invasion, before proceeding to explain 
the characteristics and goals for the various distinctive regions of the Soviet Union. Here he is 
primarily concerned with two aspects: political administration and economic exploitation, laying 
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out the future goals and expectations of different areas.
132
 Given his view, Rosenberg advocated 
for the creation of a centralized ministry with massive power to politically and economically 
organize and administer the occupied territories.
133
 The implication was that this would also 
result in some control over military operations in their areas, giving the Ostministerium (Eastern 
Ministry – OMi) more power to conduct and shape counterinsurgency warfare. Rosenberg 
outlined his administrative plan on April 29. He hoped to utilize the various non-Russian 
nationalities for Germany’s purposes, with the possibility of token self-rule in the future. 
Meanwhile, the primary economic task of such a ministry was to ensure the Wehrmacht received 
the necessary war material, which meant ensuring political stability of the occupied regions.
134
 
Four weeks into the invasion, Hitler appointed Rosenberg as the Reich Minister for the Occupied 
Eastern Territories.
135
 In theory as powerful as he wanted the ministry to be, Rosenberg’s 
authority was severely impinged upon by others’ spheres of power. They did, however, all unite 
most notably on one notion: the destruction of the Soviet Union and the exploitation of its 
resources. 
 The economy in the occupied Soviet Union was to be controlled by Hermann Göring in 
his capacity as head of the Four Year Plan, via the Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economic Staff East – 
WiStab Ost), with significant Wehrmacht cooperation.
136
 On the goal of the economy in the 
occupied Soviet Union, the WiStab Ost and the OMi agreed that the conquered country would 
support the Wehrmacht, thereby relieving more resources for Germany itself. The expected result 
was mass starvation amongst the Soviet people, which would serve two goals: providing food to 
the Third Reich and clearing Lebensraum. Rosenberg described this as a “harsh necessity,” while 
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a May 2 meeting between the relevant economic authorities concluded that “millions” would die 
of starvation extracting what was “necessary” for Germany.
137
 Based on racial ideology, what 
was also necessary in this case was the removal of up to thirty million Soviet people; a 
connection to this policy of starvation confirmed by multiple relevant authorities.
138
 Kay, in his 
study on the starvation plans in this meeting, has correctly suggested that though this was 
economically-oriented, its foundation was inescapably ideological, assuming that those racial 
elements to be starved were less important than the Germans to be fed.
139
 A May 23 paper issued 
by the WiStab Ost, stemming directly out of this meeting, made clear that “surplus” areas of food 
production, or those producing more food than they were consuming, were to be separated from 
“deficit” areas, or those consuming more food than they were producing. This, when combined 
with a higher requisition quota, was intended to create a substantial surplus, which was to go to 
Germany. The consequence, mass starvation, also conveniently aligned with ideological views 
concerning racial preservation and destruction of the Soviet people.
140
 Known as the “Hunger 
Plan”, and described by one historian as economic “triage,” this document from State Secretary 
Herbert Backe – head of the agricultural department of the WiStab Ost – formed the backbone of 
German exploitation policy.
141
   
 German food imports from the Soviet Union rapidly expanded during the period from 
1939 to the first half of 1941 as Germany was isolated from much of the world outside of Europe 
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with the outbreak of war.
142
 As part of diplomacy to keep the Soviet Union neutral and generate 
new trade opportunities, Germany created a heavy reliance on the nation against whom, it was 
broadly assumed, war would come eventually. This meant that German strategic planning for the 
invasion of the Soviet Union was in part driven by a serious need to secure food stocks to ensure 
Germany and its large military continued to be fed.
143
 This in itself did not necessitate starvation, 
but when combined with an ideology that saw Lebensraum as vital and Slavs as of little racial 
value, the gap between “military necessity” and the ideological-strategic goal of cleansing 
Lebensraum was not so significant. Given this, Backe issued his notorious “12 Commandments” 
for exploitation in early June 1941 as part of his broader “Hunger Plan”. He identified output as 
the only task of agriculture there, calling for ruthlessness in the name of providing for Germany. 
This could be achieved because, according to Backe, the Russian stomach was “elastic.”
144
 
Around the same time and emphasizing the same points as Backe, the “Guiding Principles for the 
Economic Operations in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories” were published. The “highest 
possible exploitation” was to be conducted, with no thought for the Soviet populace.
145
 The 
Wehrmacht was also accepting of this notion, both in their own requisitions (evidenced by their 
involvement in the WiStab Ost), but also in actively working to eliminate food “deficit” areas  
via starvation and active destruction.
146
 The Soviet populace was certainly not going to be 
endeared to their German occupiers for long with such a policy in action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: INVASION AND OCCUPATION 
Attack to Moscow 
The invasion codenamed “Barbarossa” began on June 22, 1941.
147
 The Proclamation 
issued by Hitler on the day of the invasion to the German people served primarily to justify the 
attack. It interpreted the conflict as a self-defensive necessity to counter the Jewish-Bolshevik 
threat, end the war with England and protect the German race.
148
 Framed as this conflict was 
within the context of an ideological struggle, the early days of the invasion seemed to confirm 
that ideology was not only at play, but that National Socialism’s judgement of the Soviet Union 
had been accurate. The massive Wehrmacht attack rolled forward across an enormous theatre of 
war, riding a tide of seemingly endless victories. The early stunning successes made Halder 
optimistic enough to declare on July 3 – a mere twelve days into the invasion – that “the 
objective to shatter the bulk of the Russian Army this side of the Dvina and Dniepr, has been 
accomplished.”
149
 After indicating that he believed the Wehrmacht would face only minimal 
resistance east of those rivers, Halder declared that “It is thus probably no overstatement to say 
that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks,” adding the cautionary 
afterthought that “this does not mean that it is closed. The shear geographical vastness of the 
country and the stubbornness of the resistance, which is carried on with all means, will claim our 
efforts for many more weeks to come.”
150
 Aside from fierce Soviet resistance, there was little to 
indicate to the Wehrmacht that their plans were not going to work. 
 Many within the Wehrmacht dismissed the Red Army as a worthy opponent. At a 
conference with Hitler on February 3, both the OKW and OKH acknowledged that while the Red 
                                                          
147
 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 54–143. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 57–118. 
148
 Domarus, ed., Hitler 4:2451. 
149






Army had quantitative superiority, German weapons and troops were better in quality. This same 
disregard was extended to the Red Army command, of which they adjudged only Semyon 
Timoshenko to be of noteworthy quality.
151
 Similar sentiments were expressed at a conference 
on April 30, where the soldiers of the Red Army were acknowledged to be tenacious, and yet 
Brauchitsch here declared severe fighting would only last for a maximum of four weeks.
152
 This 
underestimation, however, was not in any way a distinctly German perspective, and even the 
Americans were not optimistic regarding Soviet fortitude in the face of a German onslaught.
153
 
Hitler himself had certainly contributed to this contempt for the Red Army and the broader 
Soviet Union. He felt confident enough to issue a supplement on July 14 to his directive from a 
month prior that had laid out his vision for future operations to secure German hegemony. This 
supplement, in the context of this vision, outlined the manpower and arms production allotments 
for the army, air force and navy, focusing on drawing down the army in size and expanding the 
air force and navy.
154
 The vision of this directive was, of course, predicated on victory in the war 
against the Soviet Union, something which the Wehrmacht was still in the midst of at that time. 
 The Soviet Union, however, was not the rotten edifice, clay giant or house of cards that it 
had frequently been perceived to be. Amidst the rapid advances of the opening weeks of this 
massive invasion launched by the Wehrmacht, there were signs that all was not well. Even 
Halder, as exuberant as he was in the early phase of the attack, acknowledged serious Soviet 
resistance and heavy pushback against German advances within the first days.
155
 Severe 
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resistance from the Red Army, especially opposite Army Group Center, forced Hitler to alter 
plans, halting the central advance to enable the flanks to be secured prior to a renewed advance 
on Moscow.
156
 The impact of attrition by this point was already beginning to have a negative 
outcome on German capabilities. After just twenty-two days of combat, Halder calculated that 
the Wehrmacht had suffered over 146,000 casualties. This was balanced, however, by what 
Halder estimated as enormous losses suffered by the Red Army.
 
While this was true, the 
potential of the Red Army deploying units was dismissed out of hand at this time as not 
possible.
157
 As a result, despite fierce fighting and heavy casualties, there was little concern 
expressed that German plans might not be proceeding as expected. 
 Optimism began to wane drastically soon after, however, as the Wehrmacht continued to 
come up against unexpectedly furious resistance. By the end of July, the three army groups were 
reporting a cumulative 179,500 casualties, and only 47,000 of the 300,000 available reserves had 
been sent as replacements.
158
 This left the Wehrmacht forces on the Eastern Front operating at a 
significant manpower deficit after less than six weeks.
159
 Halder recorded his impressions of the 
growing divide between shrinking German manpower and seemingly unending Soviet forces, 
expressing great dismay:  
The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the 
Russian Colossus, who consistently prepared for war with that utterly ruthless 
determination so characteristic of totalitarian States. This applies to organizational 
and economic resources, as well as the communications system and, most of all, 
to the strictly military potential. At the outset of the war we reckoned with about 
200 enemy Divisions. Now we have already counted 360. Those Divisions indeed 
are not armed and equipped according to our standards, and their tactical 
leadership is often poor. But there they are, and if we smash a dozen of them, the 
Russians simply put up another dozen. The time factor favors them, as they are 
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near their own resources, while we are moving farther and farther away from 
ours. 
And so our troops, sprawled over an immense frontline, without any depth, are 
subjected to the incessant attacks of the enemy. Sometimes these are successful, 
because too many gaps must be left open in these enormous spaces.
160
 
This problem of depth, however, was only to worsen, as total Wehrmacht casualties doubled by 
the time “Typhoon” began on October 2.
161
 As expected the heaviest impact in this regard was 
felt by the armoured divisions, where, for example, Panzer Group 2 in mid-September was down 
to an average of barely 25% combat effective tank strength across its four panzer divisions.
162
 
Three weeks later, amidst the opening days of “Typhoon”, Guderian, commanding this same 
Panzer Group, notes in his memoirs that he encountered exhaustion among his men “less 
physical than spiritual.”
163
 The Wehrmacht was reaching the end of its ability to continue on at 
the same pace without sufficient replacements.
164
 The influence of attritional war was being felt 
everywhere, but final victory had not been achieved. 
 With Leningrad besieged and Kiev captured, the Wehrmacht’s attention again turned to 
Moscow with Operation “Typhoon”.
165
 Summarizing the war effort against the Soviet Union to 
that point, Hitler declared that “the preconditions were finally created for that last gigantic 
blow.”
166
 Echoing much of the same rhetoric utilized in the proclamation read out prior to the 
launching of “Barbarossa”, Hitler here glossed over the fact that the Soviet Union had still not 
been defeated. If the cracks in the Wehrmacht and Nazi planning and mindset were beginning to 
show through by this point, then “Typhoon” served to definitively expose these flaws. Within 
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two months the offensive had stalled, and the Soviets responded with a counterattack that struck 
in the dead of the cold Russian December. The counteroffensive did more than just definitively 
stifle the Wehrmacht’s attack against Moscow and its broader offensive capabilities; it also 
necessitated the utilization of rear-area forces, including Wehrmacht, SS and police units on the 
front line, thereby relieving pressure on partisans and further weakening rear security.
167
 As the 
conflict stalemated and lines began to settle in for winter, any sense of an impending and 
definitive end began to slip away. In this situation the stability of the rear became increasingly 
important at the same time as the forces available for the task were even further overextended. In 
the first experience of what was to become a pattern, events at the front dictated policies, actions 
and the very context of the rear-area with significant and often unanticipated impact. 
The Implementation of the Criminal Orders 
 With the beginning of the invasion, the German Army acted in compliance with the 
ideology that was at the foundations of the invasion. Christian Streit identifies this compliance as 
stemming primarily from two sources: the widespread fear of Bolshevism, as well as the 
competition for power between the OKH, OKW and SS within the Third Reich. He suggests that 
this acquiescence was also based on the expectation of a brief campaign, where the additional 
severity called for was more palatable based on the brevity of its employment.
168
 Felix Römer, 
however, contends that this was not a temporary measure, but rather what he describes as the 
“dogmatization” of the Sicherheit der Truppe (“security of the troops”), whereby ideology 
created the conditions for and justified the response to this war of worldviews.
169
 Streit confirms 
this dogmatization, arguing that “The Red Army’s desperate resistance and the repercussions of 
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the ‘Criminal Orders’ led to a brutalizing of combat that exceeded anything German soldiers had 
seen so far. Given this understanding, fear of Bolsheviks appeared to be justified and legitimate, 
even more so in view of the partisan warfare which itself was largely a reaction to the ‘Criminal 
Orders’.”
170
 This does not prove universal agreement or adherence, but it does explain the high 
level of obedience within the Wehrmacht to these actions. Both Römer and Streit do agree on the 
fact that the orders were in fact implemented by the majority of units within the Wehrmacht. One 
of the earliest developments in this ideological war came from the Wehrmacht’s treatment of 
Soviet POWs. The OKW, responsible for handling prisoners after they came out of operational 
zones, was clearly expecting large numbers, as they designated camps capable of holding nearly 
800,000 prior to the invasion, as well as establishing rules and regulations to be employed.
171
 
This same order from mid-June also called for the harshest brutality towards any resistance, 
which was expected especially from “Asiatic” and “Bolshevist” prisoners. Furthermore, ethnic 
identification and subsequent separation was to be employed, although no indication is made 
here of where such actions would lead.
172
 
 In line with the special role of the Einsatzgruppen operating behind the Wehrmacht in the 
Soviet Union, the army handed over substantial numbers of prisoners to these units. According to 
Nuremberg testimony by Erwin Lahousen, a high-ranking member of the Abwehr, German 
military intelligence, this selection process by the Einsatzgruppen was agreed on between the 
OKW and RSHA in the opening weeks of the invasion, the task being twofold: first, to remove 
commissars in line with the Commissar Order, and second to remove “bolshevized” elements, a 
vague catchall used most routinely to target Jews and members of other undesirable ethnicities. 
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This format continued throughout the entirety of the war.
173
 This agreement was embodied in the 
July 17 order from Heydrich to the Einsatzgruppen regarding the elements to be weeded out and 
killed from among the prisoners. In this process there was significant assistance from Wehrmacht 
troops.
174
 Initial resistance from the OKH – who had control over camps in the operational zones 
– came specifically from Wagner, who as Quartermaster General was responsible for prisoners in 
operational zones. His opposition, however, extended only to Einsatzgruppen interference in this 
filtering process, with Wagner instead calling for only the ideological enemies to be eliminated 
by the camp commanders themselves. Even this limited dissent was reversed by early October, 
so as to allow Einsatzgruppen access to OKH camps, enabling the ideological targeting process 
to continue unabated.
175
 The most noteworthy resistance came from Admiral Canaris, head of the 
Abwehr, who appealed against such regulations on legal, propagandistic, disciplinary and 
intelligence-gathering grounds in a memo to Keitel in September.
176
 Ultimately ineffective, 
Canaris’ dissent acknowledges that these guidelines derived from the existentialist ideological 
framework of the invasion itself, therein referencing that much of the driving force behind this 
treatment of prisoners stemmed specifically from the Commissar Order.  
 The mistreatment of Soviet POWs was not limited to commissars, and all were 
susceptible to neglect at the hands of their captors. A vast haul of prisoners was taken, 
particularly in the opening months of the invasion. In just seven battles up until the middle of 
October, the Wehrmacht took at least 2,053,000 prisoners, and the total by the end of 1941 was 
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 This was beyond even what the Wehrmacht had anticipated, a situation 
aggravated by an ideologically-inspired disregard of perceived sub-humans.
178
 The Wehrmacht’s 
prisoner preparations were thus easily surpassed. The outcome of this was widespread 
mistreatment of Soviet POWs, with one scholar estimating that 1,400,000 died within the first 
six months of the invasion, most due to starvation.
179
 In some camps the situation was so serious 
that fatality rates of one-hundred percent were anticipated within a few months, and in others 
fatality rates reached five percent or more per week.
180
 Halder, referencing a typhus outbreak in 
one camp, suggested that starvation was worse in other camps, stating that it was a “Ghastly 
picture, but relief appears impracticable at the moment.”
181
 In a meeting between Rosenberg and 
Hitler at the end of 1941 the high casualties amongst Soviet POWs was noted, but any concern 
was assuaged by the perception that the land was overpopulated anyways, indicating this culling 
was good.
182
 Such beliefs and reactions were only encouraged by the desire to gain Lebensraum.  
As the war expanded and greater production and resource extraction were necessary, both 
Germany and the Wehrmacht specifically required greater numbers of workers. The result of this 
was that they grew increasingly dependent on foreign labour. One of the main sources quickly 
became Soviet POWs, who were available in great numbers, if not great quality due to their 
mistreatment while imprisoned.
183
 Within the first months of the invasion this policy became 
formalized and even here a Nazi-driven racial hierarchy was at play, the intention being to 
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exploit Soviet labour to the utmost.
184
 In fact, this exploitation was two-fold, with the Germans 
not only utilizing Soviet labour, but feeding and paying them as little as possible so as to achieve 
the maximum surplus for the Third Reich.
185
 The widespread and severe mistreatment of POWs, 
especially with regards to a lack of sufficient food or shelter, was widely known even up to the 
level of Hitler himself. This was reinforced with regards to those POWs working in Germany, 
despite the concern of some regarding the influence such mistreatment might have on the 
German populace.
186
 In spite of the high mortality rates and discontent this caused, labour 
exploitation continued unabated throughout the war. The result of this mistreatment and 
exploitation was increased resistance from both the Red Army and locals. Soviet soldiers in 
combat fought harder, and those trapped behind the lines were far less prone to surrendering for 
fear of what would happen to them in captivity. Civilians witnessing this abuse of their 
countrymen had yet another reason to be discontented with German rule. The detrimental impact 
of such actions was realized even by the Germans within the first year of the conflict.
187
  
Occupation and Counterinsurgency, 1941 
 Closely connected to the handling of POWs were the administrative responsibilities of 
the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories. Although military administration of conquered 
regions during a conflict is common, the occupation of the Soviet Union, like other aspects of 
that conflict, was framed within an ideological context that shaped its substance. Given the scale 
of the conquered territory, military rule was divided into three types of zones, increasingly 
smaller and more specific the further east the zone was. The Rückwärtige Heeresgebiete (Army 
Group Rear Area) was responsible for most of the military-administered area, while the 
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individual armies had their own rear zones known as the Rückwärtige Armeegebiete (Army Rear 
Area). These two administrative structures were subdivided into smaller local commands largely 
along Soviet lines. The main goal here was to logistically secure the areas to ensure the army 
received the necessary supply, to be enforced primarily from the military’s end by nine security 
divisions, three behind each army group. These security divisions were smaller and of a poorer 
quality than combat units, yet the scope of their mission was vast.
188
 The final zone of military 
administration was the operational or combat zone, subdivided by corps, who controlled the area 
only directly behind their area of operations.
189
 That the military’s jurisdiction was to be limited 
as far as possible in favour of establishing the Reich Commissariats of the OMi had been made 




There were four pillars of German administration in the occupied Soviet Union: the 
Wehrmacht, the SS, the OMi and WiStab Ost, all attempting to achieve their own ends 
concurrently.
191
 One author characterized this multi-faceted rule as an “administrative jungle,” 
appropriately describing the often-conflicting purposes of these various organizations.
192
 The 
two most notably at cross purposes were the semi-military WiStab Ost – emphasizing longer-
term exploitation – and the Wehrmacht – more concerned with immediate supply given their 
mandate to free up resources for Germany and to prosecute the war effort. The result, as 
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characterized by one scholar, was “anarchy”.
193
 The real problem here, however, rose with the 
necessity of exploitation, as perceived by the Wehrmacht. Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, 
commenting in April 1942 while head of Army Group Center on this situation, correctly 
pinpoints the real issue: 
The demands of the OKH/GenQu for the period from 1 April 1942 to 31 March 
1943 total 1,200,000 head of horned cattle and thus exceed existing stocks, as 
calculated on the basis of a census on 1 December 1941; these stocks have been 
greatly reduced by the slaughtering of highly fertile animals. But even if one does 
not shrink from complete pillage, the last cow would have to be collected, with 
the help of police covering squads, by the very agricultural leaders whose work is 
based on the results of the new agrarian order. Such compulsory measures would 
give rise to a growth or a revival of partisan activity, whose liquidation, however, 
is a prerequisite of any utilization of the land. At present the areas controlled by 
the partisans still amount to one-third of the entire operations area.
194
 
This “last cow” policy, as von Kluge so perceptively understood, was a cycle of ruthless 
exploitation that only served to fuel resistance. Exploitation nevertheless continued, largely 
unabated due to the demands of war and the lack of empathy with the woes incurred on the 
civilian populace.  As a result, such exploitation was the rule of the day. The tensions created by 
this situation, however, were enhanced by the divided administration, especially amidst the 
severity advocated for the Wehrmacht.  
 In a July 3, 1941 radio address calling for the total mobilization of the Soviet state and 
populace, Stalin was adamant that guerrilla warfare had to form part of the resistance. Laying out 
the mindset of such a resistance, Stalin declared that the occupiers “must be hounded and 
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annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated.”
195
 The Soviets in the interwar period 
had for the most part ignored preparations for any kind of partisan war given the disorganizing 
purges and the doctrinal emphasis on offensive warfare in other countries over defence on their 
own territory.
196
 In a meeting at his headquarters two weeks later, Hitler noted that Stalin’s 
vague call to guerilla warfare was not all bad: it offered an excuse to “eradicate everyone who 
opposes us.”
197
 That this comment was couched amidst a discussion regarding the plans for 
establishing and exploiting Lebensraum in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union is not 
coincidental. This concept was further reinforced around the same time in Hitler’s supplement to 
his Directive No. 33, where he indicated that ruthlessness in the occupation was the only way to 
achieve pacification: 
The troops available for securing the conquered Eastern territories will, in view of 
the size of the area, be sufficient for their duties only if the occupying power 
meets resistance, not by legal punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror 
into the population that it loses all will to resist.  
The Commanders concerned are to be held responsible, together with the troops at 
their disposal, for quiet conditions in their areas. They will contrive to maintain 




At this point, exactly one month into the invasion, when little real resistance was being 
experienced behind the front lines, the modus operandi of the occupation was severity.
199
 This 
framework fits well within the mindset systematized by the Criminal Orders. The conflict was 
understood as ideological and existential, and thus weakness regarding any threat could spell 
disaster and destruction. Military necessity, fuelled by ideological radicalism, created an 
atmosphere where any resistance, actual or perceived, necessitated annihilation.  
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 Although frontline units were part of the same armed forces as the security units and thus 
influenced by the same ideology, their tasks and composition were quite different. The frontline 
units were concerned primarily with combat and keeping their troops supplied, and so the real 
administrative differences appeared with the more permanent occupation forces as the front line 
moved further east. This perception was also felt by those within the Wehrmacht, for instance by 
Guderian, who perceived the real issue to lie with the “so-called ‘Reich commissars.’”
200
 Cooper 
highlights two anecdotal examples of this scenario, where combat units achieved a certain peace 
and calm with the populace, only to have this shaky tolerance reversed by the subsequent 
permanent occupation in the form of administrators and garrison units.
201
 Other formative 
factors, including a lengthening war, the increasing implementation of ideology into action – 
such as violence against Jews – as well as the growing chasm between Germany and victory, and 
even the environment and culture all played a role in shaping the context of the occupation and 
resistance.
202
 What does hold true almost universally is that the longer the German occupation 
lasted, the further the populace became hostile. Otto Bräutigam, an official of the OMi 
acknowledged this in late 1942 when he suggested that the harsh inflexibility of German rule 
was detrimental to the war effort.
203
 Rather than utilizing any potential anti-Bolshevik sentiment, 
especially in the more recently-acquired Soviet territories of the borderlands, the ideological 
framework within which the occupation was conducted pushed many to resist. 
 By the fall of 1941 it was apparent that ideology drove the occupation as it drove the 
invasion itself, providing both the initial justification and the subsequent fuel and framework. 
The best early example of this came on September 12, when Keitel issued an order regarding the 
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nature and expected treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union. Referring to the Martial Jurisdiction 
Decree, this order declared that “The fight against Bolshevism necessitates indiscriminate and 
energetic accomplishment of this task, especially also against the Jews, the main carriers of 
Bolshevism.”
204
 Given this, Jews were not to be cooperated with or trusted beyond their 
utilization as labour, the only acceptable role for them.
205
 The OKW here reflects precisely 
Hitler’s attitude towards the Jews, and it disseminated this ideology to the various formations on 
the Eastern Front.
206
 This perception of the threat of Bolshevism and the Jews as its main 
propagator was further reflected in Keitel’s infamous order issued just four days later to all 
occupied territories. Arguing that Europe-wide resistance was Communist in nature and directed 
by Moscow, this order suggested that efforts to thwart it thus far had been inadequate, and that 
subsequently “we take action everywhere with the most drastic means.”
207
 Assuming the 
Communist basis of all resistance, as well as dismissing the worth of human lives in occupied 
territories, the suggested “drastic means” was a ratio of fifty to one hundred civilian hostage 
executions for the life of every German soldier taken.
208
 Harsh action, rather than more peaceful 
deterrence, was to form the basis of all occupation authorities. Since the largest and most violent 
occupation and resistance was experienced in the Soviet Union, this order had the most 
significance for that theatre. 
 With SS forces in the rear areas growing larger, their interactions with Wehrmacht rear 
area security forces and their role in the occupation also grew, specifically with regards to how 
ideology shaped the perception of resistance in the occupied regions. The increasing deployment  
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of the SS in the rear areas was hastened by the strategic attrition and defeats suffered by the 
Wehrmacht. Reinforcements became vital, further weakening garrison forces and necessitating 
the growing utilization of the SS.  The implications of this were exemplified in the Mogilev 
Conference organized in September by General Max von Schenckendorff, head of the rear area 
of Army Group Center and a strong advocate for the utilization of the SS in counterinsurgency 
efforts. At the conference, which became a watershed moment in the relationship between 
ideology and the counterinsurgency, the SS shared its ideas with the Wehrmacht.
209
 With slogans 
such as “Where the partisan is, the Jew is, and where the Jew is, there is the partisan,” coming 
out of this meeting, ideological influence was reinforced.
210
 The transfer of additional SS units to 
bolster security in the rear areas, further blurred the line between liquidation and 
counterinsurgency efforts.
211
 This trend was further exacerbated by the perception of many that 
Jews were causally connected to partisans by nature of their distinctive relationship to 
Bolshevism. Schenckendorff, for example declared that “Links between the partisan groups are 
mostly maintained by Jews. Villages and farms which are free of Jews were never partisan bases 
up to now, but they were often attacked and looted by partisan groups.”
212
 Other groups, 
including the Roma, were targeted on similar grounds.
213
 Thus, ruthlessness in the treatment of 
the populace by Wehrmacht and SS counterinsurgency forces, as well as the Einsatzgruppen, 
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was justified on the grounds that the security of the rear areas and the troops was endangered by 
enemies, Jewish and otherwise. Resistance in any form, or even a presumed connection to 
resistance, thereby became punishable by the most extreme measures. During the Pripet Marsh 
clearings in August 1941, for example, the SS Cavalry Brigade reported to have suffered 56 
casualties, including 17 fatalities, while killing 15,878 persons, including 14,178 Jews.
214
 Jürgen 
Förster, discussing this framework, suggested that “The destruction was inspired by ideology, 
but rational in its implementation. Military necessity provided the bridge.”
215
 The Wehrmacht, 
whose security was used as justification in this, also actively participated themselves. 
 Involvement in a counterinsurgency infused many German soldiers with ideology. For 
example, the 707th Infantry Division, based in the Reich Commissariat Ostland, increasingly 
radicalized their perception of the Jewish involvement with the partisans as the conflict wore on. 
The result of this development and growing concern regarding the threat of partisan war was that 
in one month of operations in late 1941 the division executed 10,431 of 10,940 prisoners for only 
two dead of its own.
216
 This disparity indicates that little real resistance was encountered at this 
point, and that even those with little to no evidence of resistance could be killed out of hand. Fear 
of the insurgency combined with insecurity stemming from the presence of Red Army soldiers 
behind the front line. This drove similarly harsh treatment by other formations, rear area units 
and front-line units.
217
 This was, for the most part, in line with an OKH directive from July 1941 
that had called for such reactions to partisans and Red Army stragglers, a large number of whom 
found themselves stranded behind the lines as a result of the rapid German advance. These 
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trained soldiers subsequently had a significant impact on the growth of the partisan movement. 
One scholar estimates that between 300,000 and 400,000 Soviet troops ended up behind the line 
– some purposefully dropped there later on – eventually comprising sixty percent of the partisan 
movement by 1942.
218
 An ideologically-fuelled invasion which advocated for the immediate 
employment of unrestrained violence as the first resort had thus helped to create the conditions 
for extraneous resistance because of the violent methods utilized, both in the advance and 
occupation.  
The most notorious of these orders clarifying the ideological implications of partisan war 
and the consequentially harsh responses came from Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau, 
commander of the Sixth Army, on October 10, 1941. He explained that the conflict had as its 
central goal the victory of National Socialism over the Asiatic-Jewish threat embodied in 
Bolshevism.
219
 Stating that the most serious consideration was the protection of logistics, 
including food, billeting and arms, Reichenau demanded decisive action without mercy. “The 
fear of the German counter-measures,” he declared, “must be stronger than the threats of 
wandering bolshevistic remnants.”
220
 These comments indicate that there were glimpses of 
humanity displayed by German soldiers, particularly regarding sharing food, a reality confirmed 
by others, such as Halder.
221
 This anecdotal evidence, however, represents the exception rather 
than the rule in this conflict. Strength in this matter, Reichenau concluded, was “the only way to 
fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish 
danger.”
222
 Hitler approved this order, after which it was disseminated to other Wehrmacht 
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formations in the Soviet Union.
223
 Reichenau’s superior, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 
issued a message to the entirety of his Army Group South along the same lines, directly 
referencing the efforts of Reichenau’s Sixth Army and emphasizing harsh policies as the best 
deterrent against resistance.
224
 Orders similar in nature to this one were also issued, for example 
by the commander of the Eleventh Army, Erich von Manstein, who specifically spoke on the 
Jewish-aided partisan threat.
225
 The Babi Yar massacre, conducted in the area of operations of 
the Sixth army only ten days before Reichenau’s original order, provides important context. 
Justified as retaliation for explosions in Kiev and with the agreement of the military authorities 
in Kiev Einsatzgruppen troops and Order Police executed over 33,000 Jews and others in two 
days.
226
 With the war dragging on and resistance growing, ideology as a pivotal factor in the 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE WAR IN THE REAR, 1942-1944 
Renewed Partisan War 
Disorganized, pressured and with little likelihood of victory, the partisan resistance in 
1941 was quite limited in both scale and efficacy. In 1942, with growing Soviet efforts, the 
fortunes began to reverse. “Partisans blasted the railroad tracks in the central front between 
Bryansk and Roslavl at five points,” Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels morosely noted in 
his diary in mid-May. For him this represented “a further proof of the extremely discomfiting 
activity of the Partisans.” Goebbels’ subsequent comment regarding the counterinsurgency 
efforts of Hungarian troops seems to directly connect the incongruence of collective reprisals and 
the occupation efforts of pacification and exploitation.
227
 The same could be said of the 
Wehrmacht’s efforts, although there was a growing realization amongst German soldiers that 
violence alone was not an effective way to control the populace. For example, in Army Group 
Center’s rear area, in the first ten months of the war, 80,000 alleged partisans had been killed, for 
a total of 3,284 German casualties, including 1,094 killed, a fatality ratio of over 73:1. These 
statistics also indicate that although the Germans were inflicting serious casualties, the partisan 
movement was not being suppressed, as shown by the increase of German casualties in the 
period from March to the beginning of May 1942. Behind Army Group Center, for example, a 
third of all German casualties in that rear area in 1942 were killed between March and the 
beginning of May. This increase does not correspond with any noticeable change in the average 
losses inflicted on partisans.
228
 With the increase of partisan activity in the spring and summer, 
the fighting intensified, as the Germans utilized large-scale sweeps during which they suffered 
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 The partisan war was growing fiercer as experienced by both the 
Wehrmacht and SS, who were increasingly indistinguishable in their counterinsurgency 
actions.
230
 More importantly, the partisans did not seem to be defeated. 
Economic and Labour Exploitation 
 The growing violence of the counterinsurgency in 1942 was exacerbated by the nature of 
the occupation itself. A primary example of this was the conscription of labour from the 
occupied areas of the Soviet Union, which became widespread with the appointment of Fritz 
Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labour by a decree from Hitler on 
March 21, 1942. Subordinated to Göring’s Four Year Plan, Sauckel was tasked with mobilizing 
labour to aid the renewed push to expand war industry as the conflict continued.
231
 Over the next 
two months Sauckel established his position and laid out his vision for the task he had been 
assigned, clarifying that the goal of managing labour and making greater use of foreign labour 
was primarily intended to maximize war output and to free up men for service in the Wehrmacht. 
Given this mission, conscription was expected if volunteering was not sufficient to fill quotas, 
necessitating the assistance of the military and other competent authorities in this process.
232
 In 
this, Sauckel ensured that those aware of his task were also aware of the superseding necessity of 
it:  
The solution of the task concerning the war mobilization of labor is of such 
decisive importance that even the most important local or regional interests 
concerning most vital peace tasks must not interfere with it. Whoever violates that 
rule must be made responsible if the German soldier in his decisive struggle for 
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Given this mindset, cruel application was the best method of achieving the goals. This is 
exemplified in a quota update sent to Rosenberg from Sauckel in October wherein 550,000 
Ukrainians were to be drafted for labour over the next seven months. Sauckel there clarified that 
“I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution of this new requirement, but I am 
convinced that with the ruthless commitment of all resources, and with the full cooperation of all 
those interested, the execution of the new demands can be accomplished for the fixed date.”
234
 In 
addition to the exploitation of resources, the German occupation was on its way to being shaped 
by the exploitation of Soviet manpower.  
 Despite the fact that Sauckel’s early directives had established that the treatment of 
labour was to be civil, the reality was quite different. A memo written in September, just five 
months after Sauckel’s appointment, noted that on almost every point the treatment of the 
Ostarbeiter (Eastern workers) directly contravened Sauckel’s idealized plan, indicating systemic 
disregard rather than sporadic issues.
235
 Tooze, in his study of the economic nature of the Third 
Reich in war, attributes this destructive process to the intersection of the need for increased 
production and an ideological disregard for the life of Untermenschen.
236
 The Wehrmacht 
routinely complied with this policy, as can be seen by the fact that of the 1,685,000 Ostarbeiter 
in March 1943, fully half had come from Wehrmacht-administered areas.
237
 This labour 
conscription also, as noted by Sauckel himself, aided the Wehrmacht by freeing up “hundreds of 
thousands” of German men for military service.
238
 The Wehrmacht’s role in this process was 
immense, and their involvement speaks volumes. Amidst growing evidence of the cruelty and 
abuse exhibited in the conscription and transportation of this labour, Sauckel’s power only grew, 
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resulting in increased quotas and higher importance in the Nazi administration, especially in 
1943. Such a policy was so unsustainable that even those responsible for implementing the 
“Hunger Plan” complained, with one official in Minsk stating in 1943 that “The recruitment 
measures in the last months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable 
political and economic effect.”
239
 It also came up directly against the eliminations being 
conducted by the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union, where the need for labour contradicted a 
general disregard for human life. In an order issued to its subordinate units, Sonderkommando 4a 
– a part of Einsatzgruppe C – ordered that the necessary “special treatments” be limited as far as 
possible in favour of gathering labour, including the provision that “As a rule, no more children 
will be shot.”
240
 The labour effort had thus become paramount. 
 The primary intersection between the German occupation and the average Soviet citizen 
was in agriculture, where, after the destruction of most industry in the scorched earth strategy 
utilized by the Red Army in retreat, much of the populace was employed. Arguably one of the 
most effective ways in which the German occupation could have helped to win over the Soviet 
populace was a land reform, presuming the dissolution of the collective farms and the 
privatization of land for farmers. Such a reform could have earned the sympathy of the 
population, thereby impeding partisan growth. There was, however, little movement on this issue 
in the first year of the occupation. Goebbels himself identified this problem in mid-1942: 
The new slogan, ‘Land for the Peasants!’ appealed especially strongly to the rural 
population. We could have achieved this success much earlier if we had been 
cleverer and more farsighted. But we were geared altogether too much to a brief 
campaign and saw victory so close to our very eyes that we thought it unnecessary 
to both about psychological questions of this sort. What we then missed we must 
now attempt to catch up with the hard way.
241
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Even had the Germans cared about the well-being or support of the Soviet populace, few of their 
decision-makers believed that the war would last long enough for that to become a relevant 
concern. They were far more concerned with exploiting the Soviet Union to the greatest extent, 
especially with regards to foodstuffs. As Keitel made clear in an order from autumn 1942, 
The food situation of the German people is such that it is necessary for the Armed 
Forces to contribute as far as possible towards alleviating it. All the necessary 
means of doing so exist in the combat zones and in the occupied zones in the 
occupied territories both in the East and West. 
It is essential, above all, that much greater quantities of supplies and forage … 
should be secured in the occupied territories of the East than has been the case up 
to now. 
All establishments should consider it their pride as well as their duty to attain this 




This order indicates continuity rather than a change of policy. Nevertheless, as the conflict in the 
Soviet Union entered its second year, advocates of reform became louder and more numerous as 
it became increasingly apparent that the dogmatic application of ideology was harming rather 
than aiding the war effort.  
 Whether for political or practical reasons, the OMi was among the first organizations to 
advocate for true reform. As early as a May 1942, Rosenberg noted that the economic situation 
in the occupied Soviet Union – dominated by Germans and geared towards exploitation – caused 
great resentment and discontent amongst the populace.
243
 In a memo written in October 1942, 
Bräutigam comprehensively critiqued the attitude behind and actions of the German authorities 
in the Soviet Union. He believed that an agrarian reform would be a highly effective method for 
winning over the people: “A form of government which was not intent only on plundering and 
exploitation and which put aside the Bolshevist methods would have kindled the greatest 
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enthusiasm and put at our disposal a mass of millions. And the enthusiasm in the occupied 
Eastern territories would have had its reaction on the force of resistance of the Red Army.”
244
 
Suggesting that agrarian reform and the dismantling of collective farms would have gone a long 
way to providing this eagerness, Bräutigam decried the hesitation and opposition on the part of 
some authorities, specifically of those enforcing the Four Year Plan and the heads of both Reich 
Commissariats. This, he argued, was having an increasingly negative impact on the populace’s 
perception of the German administration, thus fuelling Soviet propaganda and resistance.
245
 For 
Bräutigam, the overall solution was obvious: treat the Soviet populace better and give them 
something to look forward to, otherwise “the power of resistance of the Red army and of the 
whole Russian people will mount still more, and Germany must continue to sacrifice her best 
blood.”
246
 This assessment was concurred with by a detailed report in December from the OMi 
liaison with Army Group North, which asserted that “the present Eastern policy must undergo a 
fundamental change in its basic points.”
247
 This sentiment was again reinforced at a conference 




Counterinsurgency Policy Changes in 1942 
 Good relations between the administration and the civilian populace are vital to a 
successful counterinsurgency, and reform is a key tool in the arsenal of the occupier to 
encouraging this state of affairs. Misunderstanding of this fact was one of the primary issues in 
the German occupation. As Dallin points out, the reforms that were made in 1942 and 1943 were 
for the most part negated by the cruelty exhibited in the process of the anti-partisan war and the 
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occupation: “Terrorism and other German measures, notably forced labour conscription, wiped 
out whatever political benefit the Reich might have derived from the more substantial agrarian 
reform.”
249
 Half-hearted and belated reforms did little to change people’s minds in the face of so 
much negative experience, further exacerbated by the fact that the partisans increasingly 
frustrated their enforcement. For example, in a mid-1943 report to Rosenberg from a region of 
Reich Commissariat Ukraine, while reforms were underway to redistribute land in cooperatives – 
a half-way measure between collectivization and privatization – less than half of the area’s 
resources were under German control due to the widespread activity of partisans. Furthermore, 
those working for Germany were increasingly in danger of being attacked by partisans.
250
 
Worsening this situation, the OKW initiated a scorched-earth policy in tandem with the complete 
evacuation of economic and human resources from areas threatened by the Red Army, as the war 
decisively turned against Germany in the summer of 1943.
251
  
 This growing sense of a need for change in the German occupation authority was 
matched in the military, and the results were equally mixed. The OKW first attempted to come to 
grips with the reality which hit them in the 1941-2 winter reverses: that the Red Army and thus 
the Soviet Union were not broken. As Warlimont notes, Hitler agreed – largely at the 
Wehrmacht’s behest – in May 1942 to temporarily reverse the policy targeting commissars and 
guarantee their lives. Intended as an experiment, the purpose was to encourage desertion and 
surrender, despite Warlimont’s subsequent and dubious assertion that the original order had been 
largely ignored from the beginning.
252
 It does, however, suggest that although the Wehrmacht 
had shown itself more than willing to accept ideological orders, it had doubts about their 
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implementation when it saw that these orders were counterproductive. This style of reform 
became increasingly common as the war continued. Rather than expressing moral reservations in 
this situation, the Wehrmacht justified their concern of the impact of such policy on their ability 
to achieve victory, their primary goal as a military force. The fact that Hitler had the final say in 
military decision-making was to have grave consequences for the German counterinsurgency in 
1942 amidst the growing call for overall reform. The partisan war was expanding and becoming 
increasingly violent, meaning that more Wehrmacht resources were being utilized to fight the 
growing insurgency in the rear.
253
 
 The first response took place on August 18, 1942, when Hitler issued his Directive No. 
46. This, however, was more a continuation than an alteration. Citing the growing threat of 
“banditry” – the name given to partisans by the Germans – to the Wehrmacht’s logistics and the 
economic exploitation, the directive demanded that the guerrillas be “substantially exterminated” 
with all means available.
254
 “Active operations” and “rigorous measures,” including collective 
reprisals, were to be applied at the same time as the population was to be dealt with “strictly but 
justly.”
255
 This directive acknowledged the role of the population in defeating the partisans, but 
both severity and leniency were called for. One scholar has classified the internal contradictions 
of this directive, in relation to the earlier supplement to Directive No. 33, as an attempt to 
“square the circle.”
256
 The delineation between the areas of responsibility in the 
counterinsurgency between the SS and the Wehrmacht was reinforced, with the SS in total 
control in the Reich Commissariats, while the Wehrmacht were exclusively in control in the 
areas of military administration. In areas of responsibility that crossed over administrative 
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boundaries, however, it was the SS who gained power. Himmler was designated as the “central 
authority” in the war against the partisans, and while Wehrmacht units could still be 
subordinated to SS commanders, there is no mention of SS forces being subordinated to 
Wehrmacht commanders.
257
 Furthermore, an increase of forces, both German and collaborator, 
was to take place. That collaborator units were being built up indicates that National Socialist 
ideology could be overruled by pragmatic needs in certain situations.
258
 The promotion of the SS 
to the primary authority on counterinsurgency, however, suggests that ideology remained central. 
The growing role of the SS stemmed primarily from the same motivation as what drove the 
development of collaborator forces: a pragmatic need of dedicated manpower. While they 
possessed more sufficient forces for the task than the Wehrmacht, their prominent ideological 
basis was no disqualifier. As a result, this increasingly came to define the counterinsurgency. 
 In his new capacity as head of the counterinsurgency in the Soviet Union, Himmler 
appointed Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski as “Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units” on October 
23, 1942. Formerly Hoher SS- und Polizei Führer (HSSPF) Center – the  ranking SS commander 
behind Army Group Center – Bach-Zelewski’s new position had him serving as the head of the 
German counterinsurgency in the Soviet Union as Himmler’s representative.
259
 This reflected the 
SS’s growing role in the counterinsurgency, as well as their established authority over the 
German state’s security apparatus. His appointment was also looked on favourably by Hitler, 
who viewed him as a “clever chap,” who could handle difficult missions.
260
 The increasing 
power of the SS in the counterinsurgency indicates that the growing impact of partisans was to 
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be countered with more ideology, rather than less.
261
 This continued, rather than countered, a 
pattern of ideologically-influenced counterinsurgency.
262
 The “reform” in the counterinsurgency 
came on November 11, 1942, when the OKW issued the “Combat Directive for the Anti-Partisan 
Warfare in the East” described by one historian as providing justification for both the reformer 
and the radical.
263
 It was only slightly more lenient than the framework established by Directive 
No. 46, calling for decisive but fair responses to resistance. This Wehrmacht directive, however, 
did not sit well with Hitler, who as a result issued a further clarification on December 16 wherein 
he stressed that there were to be no restrictions in the combating of partisans: 
If this war against the bands in the East and in the Balkans is not waged with the 
most brutal methods, the available forces will in the near future no longer be 
sufficient to overcome this plague. 
For this reason the troops are justified and obliged in this combat to resort to all 




The reasoning for this decision was not new or any different from previous directives on the 
matter. Rather, it was a continuation of policy, flying directly in the face of any desires for 
reform. Fearful that any hints of leniency in the counterinsurgency might mean ultimate defeat, 
Hitler reacted quickly to ensure there was no confusion. 
Counterinsurgency, 1942-1944 
 Military necessity, the justification which had initially encouraged ideological alignment 
subsequently became one of the primary motivators for changing policy. Ideological adherence 
was not so blind in the Wehrmacht as may be presumed based on the military’s overall record 
during the Second World War. As Dallin notes, Ewald von Kleist and Erich von Manstein, 
commanders of Army Group A and Army Group South, respectively, among others began 
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issuing calls for moderation and cooperation with the populace.
265
 The varying perspectives of 
how to handle the people so as to best subdue them were all provided with justification by the 
orders and directives issued in late 1942. The occupation authorities were never fully able to 
escape from the notion that resistance was to be punished in the most violent way. This attitude 
came increasingly into contact with that perspective that saw a more balanced and nuanced 
approach as the way to achieve the sought-after quiet in the rear. General Hans Röttiger, Chief of 
Staff for the Fourth Army in Army Group Center, noted in an affidavit for the Nuremberg Trials 
that while harshness was often advocated from up the Wehrmacht hierarchy, other methods 
could be and were implemented. In the case of the Fourth Army, he claims that their area was for 
the most part clear of partisans by the spring of 1943, the result of a more balanced approach that 
included taking – rather than executing – prisoners and employing propaganda alongside 
incentives.
266
 Similarly, Adolf Heusinger, head of the OKH’s Operations Department, was 
highly critical after the war of the occupation’s methods. According to his statement at 
Nuremberg, he had disapproved of the “military insanity” throughout the war, believing such 
ruthlessness to have been a “welcome opportunity” to eradicate undesirables.
267
 Though this 
retrospective condemnation must be treated cautiously, it becomes apparent the tying together of 
counterinsurgency and ideologically-motivated mass killing was a widespread policy, and that 
many were aware of it. 
 Although this ambiguous approach to counterinsurgency did enable certain flexibility, the 
overarching emphasis remained with the application of force. This was exemplified in Operation 
“Cottbus”, which took place in the early summer of 1943. Utilizing units of the Wehrmacht, SS 
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and police, and commanded by SS General Curt von Gottberg, the operation targeted a partisan 
stronghold in Belarus. The result was 6,000 killed in battle, 3,700 “liquidated” afterwards and 
600 prisoners taken. A further 5,500 men and women conscripted for labour, and another 2-3,000 
civilians died in “cleaning-up” – by walking over – minefields. In exchange, the Germans and 
their auxiliary forces suffered a total of 672 casualties, including 127 killed. The collection of 
weapons seized totalled 47 artillery weapons and 1,025 small arms. All of this information 
comes from an SS report on the operation, signed by Bach-Zelewski himself, further indicating 
awareness at the highest levels.
268
 The disparity in casualties, as well as in weapons found 
indicates that while this operation did engage partisans, the vast majority encountered were 
nothing of the sort. This operation was heavily criticized, specifically by officials from OMi and 
the Reich Commissariat Ostland, where the operation took place. Reich Commissar Lohse went 
so far as to compare the operation to an infamous Soviet massacre of Poles discovered by the 
Germans earlier in the invasion, asking “What is Katyn against that?”
269
 The outcome, however, 
was no change in counterinsurgency policy. In fact these methods were approved by the OKH, as 
witnessed by the medal given several months later to Oskar Dirlewanger, a notoriously brutal SS 
commander. Partly in recognition for his units’ actions in “Cottbus”, the citation commended the 
unit and its commander for killing 15,000 “guerillas” and seizing 1,456 weapons while suffering 
“a minimum of losses” with 318 casualties, including 92 fatalities.
270
 
 Such sweeps and harshness did not, however, defeat or even discourage partisan activity. 
Hill, in his study of the counterinsurgency by Army Group North, has shown that in their area of 
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responsibility alone, partisan actions in 1943 increased by up to 500%.
271
 Alfred Jodl, Chief of 
the OKW’s Operations Department, in his testimony at Nuremberg cited 1,560 train attacks in 
July and a further 2,600 in September of that year against Axis forces in the Soviet Union as 
evidence of the increasing tempo of partisan activity.
272
 The deteriorating security of the rear was 
further exacerbated by the front-line context of 1943. The year opened with the decisive defeat of 
Germany at Stalingrad with the surrender of Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus’ Sixth Army in the 
midst of large-scale Soviet counteroffensives. This continued with the stunting of the 
Wehrmacht’s Operation “Citadel” at the Kursk Salient in the summer.
273
 The German forces, 
already overextended, were further stretched by the losses suffered. This further undermined 
security in the already-undermanned rear areas. From the summer of 1943 on, the Red Army 
decisively held the strategic advantage, although the German withdrawal from the Soviet Union 
took more than another full year. With the SS increasingly responsible for counterinsurgency 
efforts and the plan to retreat behind a policy of scorched earth, the situation of occupation did 




 The deteriorating strategic situation that faced the Wehrmacht from 1943 did not result in 
a growing distance between National Socialism and the armed forces. Rather, 1943 represents a 
year in which that relationship grew closer than it had ever been previously.
275
 This can be seen 
most especially in the utilization of Nazi-style ideological officers within the Wehrmacht. These 
Nationalsozialistischer Führungsoffiziere (“National Socialist Leadership Officers” – NSFOs) 
were intended to maintain morale and ensure adherence to the tenets of National Socialism. 
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Deep-seated fear of the power of the military to interfere with or bring down the National 
Socialist state, as well as a growing desperation for the reinvigoration of the military made this 
move appealing. Such a move was in part welcomed by the troops themselves.
276
 The 
introduction of these officers discarded military rationality in favour of an insistence on fervent 
ideological loyalty.
277
 The true result, however, as noted by one scholar, was a growing 
prevalence of nihilism amidst an already-stringent atmosphere in terms of discipline worsened by 
the increasing politicization of the war.
278
 Such an attitude perpetuated German reactions to 
resistance. Even the failed plot of July 20, 1944 to kill Hitler only reinforced the sincerity with 
which the military maintained its adherence to National Socialism, as well as the ties binding the 
two pillars together.
279
 The creation and power of this cadre within the Wehrmacht signifies just 
how far this alliance had progressed. 
It was in the final phase of retreat from the Soviet Union that the Wehrmacht made its 
first sincere attempt at reforming their occupation. Issued on May 6, 1944 by the OKW, the 
directive entitled “Warfare against Bands” was a direct successor to the November 11, 1942 
directive.
280
 Perceived by Jodl, the author of the document, as a moderate approach to the 
counterinsurgency, the reality is that this was an example of too little, too late.
281
 While it 
certainly advocated for a more lenient counterinsurgency policy, the harshness was still 
prevalent. For example, collective reprisals were still allowed, and instead the threshold of 
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responsibility was simply shifted upwards to the division commander level with regards to the 
Wehrmacht.
282
 Nevertheless, the directive does seem to have had some positive influence in the 
brief time it was implemented. This can be seen by the drastic change in the number of captured 
and deserting partisans compared to those killed in the area of Army Group Center. In the 
preceding months, February to April 1944, the approximate ratios of partisans captured or 
deserted to those killed were, respectively, 1:3.5, 1:3.8 and 1:4.8. Meanwhile, in May and June 
the ratios in this same area were 1:1.9 and 1:2.5, respectively. While based on incomplete data, 
these numbers nevertheless indicate that newly-implemented policies had an important influence 
on how the counterinsurgency was conducted.
283
 The impact, however, was brief and the new 
policy could never take root in any meaningful way. This document was issued only seven weeks 
before the Red Army’s Operation “Bagration” began, which ultimately drove the Wehrmacht out 
of the Soviet Union. In other words, a significant alteration to the Wehrmacht’s 
counterinsurgency policy that might have positively improved their practice to the point of 
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 Following the end of the occupation of the Soviet Union in 1944 when Germany had 
been forced to leave its territory, Rosenberg reflected back on the administration effort. While 
arguing for a united command in future endeavours, the former head of the OMi also 
characterized the three years of occupation as being defined by “a boastful arrogance, which in 
wide circles, indeed sometimes even in public, proclaimed the inferiority of the subject peoples 
without the elementary political awareness that such an attitude must provoke hatred and 
resistance in any people”
284
 Rosenberg’s comments illustrate the fact that contempt for the 
Soviet people was prominent, both before and during the conflict. Dallin, discussing the German 
occupation of the Ukraine specifically, clarifies exactly what this meant in the context of the 
counterinsurgency:  
… ignoring the voices clamouring for a new ‘enlightened’ policy, those who had 
authority – from Hitler to Koch – remained stubbornly committed to their myths 
and visions. While the German troops were victorious, concessions to popular 
aspirations were considered superfluous; when they lost, concessions were 
deemed dangerous. When resistance snowballed, the reply was increased terror 
against the ‘unruly hordes’.
285
  
These two reflections, one from a leader in the administration and the other a scholar studying it 
after the fact can both be summed up in one word: ideology. While resistance further soured this 
ideological framework, the reality is that it had been established before the first soldier crossed 
the Soviet frontier on June 22, 1941.  
 In the decades since the Second World War came to an end, debate has raged over the 
roots and causes of the evils committed by the Nazi regime, as well as the motivations of the 
many thousands of Germans who aided its efforts in a variety of roles. In more recent years this 
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can be seen in the debate which was ignited from some dormancy by the controversial work of 
Daniel Goldhagen, who argued from a deterministic perspective for the success of National 
Socialism in Germany.
286
 While this argument has, for the most part, been discarded by 
academics as deterministic and insufficiently evidenced, the question of individual responsibility 
in the era of Nazi Germany remains. Another scholar has identified broader cooperation as 
representing an “array of complicity” within German society towards National Socialism.
287
 As 
an organization, the Wehrmacht was the largest group among Germans that supported Hitler in 
his goals. Proving knowledge, intent and support of National Socialism and what it stood for 
among individual members of the German military is impossible on any grand scale, although 
examination of the diaries of various soldiers – from Landsers to field marshals – provides an 
enlightening glimpse. Undoubtedly the reactions and convictions of individual soldiers varied 
widely, from total adherence to total disregard, across the entire structure of the Wehrmacht. 
Nevertheless, military hierarchies are rigid and institutional, so individual feelings rarely factor 
in any meaningful way without great external pressure. So while the Wehrmacht was represented 
both by soldiers who killed unarmed civilians and soldiers who gave other civilians food, the 
organization within which such actions took place viewed the former action as necessary 
harshness and the latter as weakness. As a result of the long and profound infiltration of National 
Socialism into the Wehrmacht, its subsequent actions are best understood as being framed by this 
ideology. Even though understanding intent might help explain why certain actions were or were 
not taken, it does not change the fact that actions were taken. In this context, those actions had a 
direct and important impact on the chances for success of the counterinsurgency conducted by 
the Wehrmacht throughout the occupation. The fact is that National Socialism was able to seep 
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into and alter mindsets. This made the requisite patience and balanced strategy necessary to 
achieve victory in a counterinsurgency difficult to establish at an institutional level or for 
extended periods of time. 
 National Socialism, as established by Hitler, was based around three primary concepts: 
land, race and struggle. Oversimplified, National Socialism, with specific reference to the 
German nation, advocated for struggle to secure land to protect the superior Aryan race. Because 
the Aryans – as culture-creators – were important to the survival of humanity, they required 
greater land to thrive, the logic following that this land should come primarily at the cost of 
inferior peoples, in this case the Slavs of Eastern Europe. Conveniently, the Soviet Union offered 
the perfect ideological trifecta for National Socialism in that: 1) its destruction was justified on 
account of its Bolshevik and Jewish leadership; 2) it had vast and bountiful lands; and 3) it was 
populated by Slavs who were both weak and superfluous, and therefore easily conquered and 
removed. Upon gaining power, this animosity towards the Soviet Union was not readily apparent 
amongst many in the Nazi party, largely for reasons of practicality and more immediate 
concerns, including securing and purifying Germany itself. It was, however, during these early 
years that the ideological groundwork and political control was achieved by Hitler over the 
Wehrmacht. As a result, when plans for war against the Soviet Union finally came to the 
forefront in 1940, this Weltanschauung was quickly introduced, as can be seen with plans for the 
mostly Slavic nation following its conquest, as well as the Criminal Orders implemented in the 
months prior to the actual invasion. The influence of this ideology remains central to 
understanding why the counterinsurgency was conducted in the way that it was. While ideology 
helped to shape military thinking, nowhere was this more prevalent than in the Wehrmacht’s 




 Though clear and detailed plans regarding the exploitation of the Soviet territory were 
established both prior to and during the invasion, the same cannot be said for the Wehrmacht’s 
role in securing the rear areas. This can be attributed to the fact that the war against the Soviet 
Union, like other wars conducted by the Wehrmacht to that point in the war, was intended to 
rapidly lead to a conclusion. In the Soviet context a gamble on the Blitzkrieg-style warfare was 
aggravated by the ideological premises formulated by Hitler, premises that had thoroughly 
infected both the political and military authorities in Germany. Events in the first weeks of the 
invasion did not alter this mentality, although even by July it was becoming apparent that the war 
was not progressing as planned. As a result, as the Wehrmacht began to occupy Soviet territory, 
either in its own administration or as a subordinate force to the Reich Commissariats, the conflict 
was not drawing down, but instead growing, further straining an already-immense task. Large 
numbers of Red Army soldiers, stranded by the speedy German advance and discouraged from 
surrendering by the German treatment of prisoners, engaged in partisan war. When the front 
stabilized, the Soviet state could invest in aiding the partisans with equipment, training and 
experts, thereby encouraging further and fiercer resistance. The German occupation did little to 
effectively discourage or defeat such efforts. 
 Ideology, more than just influencing the planning phase of operations, also shaped how 
the Wehrmacht fought its war. The Criminal Orders, specifically the Martial Jurisdiction Decree, 
the Directives for the Behaviour of the Troops in Russia and the Commissar Order, had the 
intended consequence of further brutalizing the nature of the invasion, on both the front line and 
in the rear. In contradiction to the highly-structured and highly-disciplined nature of military 
organization and authority, these orders disseminated responsibility regarding the treatment of 




and ruthless exploitation of local labour and resources. The fact that the underlying mentality 
changed slowly over the course of the war suggests that the concept of military necessity still 
held weight. There was, however, little change at the highest levels, particularly among the 
strongest ideological adherents to Nazism. While the Third Reich’s war effort crumbled, 
ideological influence over the Wehrmacht grew drastically, rather than receding. As the conflict 
progressed and the security situation in the rear deteriorated, it became increasingly apparent that 
a more nuanced and balanced approach to the civilian populace was vital to separating them 
from the partisans. This was, however, the opposite of what was being propagated by the 
decision makers, who believed that the real issues were a lack of energy in suppressing any and 
all resistance. This mentality can be witnessed in the growing leadership role which the SS took 
in the counterinsurgency, not a good sign for a more balanced approach. The bed that the 
Wehrmacht had made with National Socialism now came around to almost entirely deny them 
any flexibility they might have desired.  
Even though the war against the Soviet Union would lead the Third Reich to its grave, 
the partisan resistance played a relatively minor role in the Soviet war effort. While the partisans 
did achieve success, particularly regarding logistical disruption, intelligence gathering and the 
maintenance of Soviet authority in the occupied areas, the partisans were not central to 
destroying the Wehrmacht.
288
 The fact remains, however, that the war in the rear was brutal, as 
called for by both sides. The scale of the area involved, the desperation experienced by those on 
both sides and the realities of war all shaped how this counterinsurgency was perceived and 
fought. In contextualizing this issue, it becomes even more apparent that ideology did not play a 
role as an afterthought or that it was introduced ex post facto as a motivator. Rather, National 
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Socialism altered the very foundations of military planning, discipline and hierarchy prior to and 
during the conflict with the Soviet Union. This was done deliberately with the intention of 
providing the fuel necessary to drive a Weltanschauungskrieg. While this approach certainly 
encouraged ruthlessness in the counterinsurgency, it also made alternative approaches 
undesirable and difficult to implement. The partisans may not have been as effective as the Red 
Army had hoped, but neither did the Wehrmacht achieve “quiet in the rear.” Ideology did then 
play a vital role in the nature of the counterinsurgency by radicalizing the means, although it did 
not achieve the desired ends.  
In the years following the war it has been the role and motivations of the German military 
in particular that have received the most focus and created the greatest debate. One needs to look 
no further than the notorious Historikerstreit experienced by Germany in the 1980s to realize that 
this issue, and the broader problem of how to remember and contextualize the experience of the 
Second World War has not been resolved. Efforts to absolve average Germans of any sense of 
guilt or culpability, together with the desire to entirely distinguish between actions of the military 
and of the Nazis, intended to heal the nation, only offered a temporary bandage, and a weak one 
at best.
289
 One historian even described the entire resultant historiographical episode as “more 
heat than light,” reflecting the fact that the war – as a historical event – is still very fresh in the 
minds of many.
290
 This extends beyond simply the strong sentiments engendered by the legacy 
of this conflict. The contemporary world is much the product of the Second World War, and 
many of the events experienced today have direct connections to events which transpired during 
and because of that conflict. This is also true of the two main topics at issue here: specifically, 
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the influence of National Socialism and Hitler on the Wehrmacht, and the resultant 
counterinsurgency against the Soviet partisans. In both of these it can be safely said that the 
Wehrmacht was a central actor, forming one of the most prominent intersections between these 
two subjects. Ideology was a decisive factor in shaping the counterinsurgency, and its impact 
was counterproductive in the effort to either defeat the partisans or appease the populace. If 
history is, as Hitler thought, the tracing of human struggle, then the Wehrmacht’s 
counterinsurgency represents a microcosmic example of National Socialism’s failure. 
The impact of such unconventional conflicts on broader struggles has continued on 
through to the twenty-first century. In fact, the utilization of guerilla warfare seems to be on the 
rise in the era of nuclear deterrence and powerful conventional militaries. While the dominant 
ideologies have changed drastically from those experienced during the Second World War, the 
overall influence of ideology has remained significant. The best contemporary example of this 
can be seen in the irregular conflicts fought by democracies against para-religious insurgencies 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq over the past fifteen years. Led by the United States and aided by 
numerous other nations sharing their political, social, economic and moral values, both of these 
conflicts stem from the War on Terror declared after the events of September 11, 2001. Initially 
intended as conflicts against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the regime of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq, these dual conflicts quickly morphed into extended counterinsurgencies to aid in 
establishing viable democracies in both countries. Rather than wholeheartedly embracing 
democracy and what it offers, there has been a noticeably more lukewarm reception to this 
imposition by the populaces. The assumption and hope of those who launched these campaigns 




Markedly different from the conflict between the Third Reich and Soviet partisans, there are 
nevertheless noteworthy parallels to be found in the West’s struggle. 
The imposition of democratic values, while significantly less violent in its application 
than National Socialism, still contextualized how the insurgency was to be countered, just as the 
Wehrmacht was influenced by Hitler’s ideology. This shaped strategy and tactics at all levels, 
but has not led to a definitive closure of the conflict. Western militaries, primarily trained for 
conventional conflict in the Cold War vein, have had to entirely alter their mindset and skills to 
implement effective counterinsurgencies, which in the case of democratic ideology require an 
immensely deft approach. Furthermore, the implementation of democratic principles in all 
spheres of life requires enormous financial investment, as well as the commitment of personnel 
and political willpower. As liberal ideology understands national self-determination to be vital, 
the near-total reliance on local forces has resulted in festering insurgencies that continue in the 
form of ISIS and the Taliban. The heavy dependence on firepower, justified not only by the 
desire to reduce counterinsurgency casualties but also by ideology labelling the opponents as 
“terrorists”, and the ensuing disregard of “collateral damage”, aggravated this trend. Finally, the 
influence of public opinion on the governmental decision-making process in liberal democracies, 
in tandem with unprecedented public exposure to the events of such conflicts around the globe 
via technology and far-reaching news coverage has created a situation in which proper 
counterinsurgencies are difficult or impossible to maintain. Counterinsurgencies, by their nature, 
are drawn out attritional conflicts. With the public in democracies made aware of casualties and 
costs incurred in counterinsurgencies immediately and often in great detail, support for the 
continuation of such conflicts is largely unsustainable. As members of a liberal democracy, the 




The serious and sustained commitment of sufficient forces and support necessary to defeat 
insurgencies seems to have been lost to twenty-first century democracies moving forward. This 
presents a difficult problem to these countries, particularly in a world seemingly moving toward 
such types of conflicts with increasing regularity.  
While the counterinsurgency practiced by Nazi Germany and fought by the Wehrmacht 
varies widely from this more contemporary scenario, the impact of ideology on war planning 
remains strikingly similar. Just as the Wehrmacht and other occupation authorities were unable 
and often unwilling to escape the constraints placed on their efforts by their adopted worldview, 
so too have democracies demonstrated ideological determinism in their approaches to 
counterinsurgency. This determinism is no more or less central to shaping worldviews in the 
West than National Socialism was in Nazi Germany, although the outcome is markedly different. 
Ideology remains an inescapable part of the national character in every country and across the 
political spectrum. The application of this research regarding the Wehrmacht’s struggles to 
contain Soviet partisans should serve as a call to contemplation as to how Western liberal states 
shape, influence and constrain engagement in counterinsurgencies.  Regardless of whether 
history repeats, rhymes or simply guides, the anecdotal evidence would suggest that 
democracies, just like National Socialism, are doomed to fail against insurgencies if they remain 
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